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I. INTRODUCTION
"Vested rights" are the legal protections that a property owner
can rely on when developing real property to ensure that a subse-
quently enacted regulation will not impair the project he or she ini-
tially applied to build.2 Determining the precise stage in the develop-
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1. The vested rights doctrine addressed in this Article applies only to the development of
real property. Other kinds of rights "vest," such as the point in time in which an employee's
right to receive a pension accrues, but these general rights are not part of the land development-
related vested rights discussed in this Article. See generally Godfrey v. State, 84 Wash. 2d 959,
962-63, 530 P.2d 630, 632 (1975) (discussing the general concept of the vesting of nonland
development-related rights).
2. A vested right is different from a "grandfather" clause. A grandfather clause is merely a
"[p]rovision in a new law or regulation exempting those already in or a part of the existing sys-
tem which is being regulated." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 699 (6th ed. 1990). A grandfather
clause is the result of "legislative grace," meaning that a local government chooses to allow citi-
zens to benefit from the previous standard. Grayson P. Hanes & J. Randall Minchew, On Vested
Rights to Land Use and Development, 46 WASH. & LEE. L. REV. 373, 379 (1989). In contrast to a
grandfather clause, a vested right is not a local government's choice, but rather a legal protection
against government action.
A vested right is different from a nonconforming use. Westside Business Park v. Pierce
County, 100 Wash. App. 599, 5 P.3d 713 (2000), rev. denied, 141 Wash. 2d 1023, 10 P.3d 1075
(2000) (distinguishing vested rights from nonconforming uses). "A nonconforming use is a use
which lawfully existed prior to the enactment of a zoning ordinance, and which is maintained
after the effective date of the ordinance, although it does not comply with the zoning restrictions
applicable to the district in which it is situated." Rhod-A-Zalea & 35th, Inc. v. Snohomish
County, 136 Wash. 2d 1, 6, 959 P.2d 1024, 1027 (1998). The fundamental difference is that a
vested right allows the establishment of a use of property that is lawful at the time of application;
the law of nonconforming uses involves the continuation of a now unlawful use. See Weyerhaeu-
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ment process at which a developer is protected from changing regula-
tions is the focus of the vested rights doctrine.' Until a property
owner acquires a vested right to complete a project, local governments
can subject him or her to newly adopted regulations. Because they
often involve the politically explosive issue of new growth in a com-
munity, vested rights are often a volatile issue.'
Why should people care about vested rights? The most specific
reason is that vested rights are absolutely critical in the real estate
development process because they ensure certainty and fairness; with-
out them, the economic engine of the building industry is stifled,
resulting in unnecessary and unfair losses for property owners and lost
tax revenues for local governments. But the more general reason to
care about vested rights is the fact that they are the jurisprudential
testing ground for a much bigger issue: the ebbs and flows of the
protection of individual rights versus the power of the government to
impose regulations. Therefore, everyone-not just land use practi-
tioners-should pay close attention to which side is winning this
contest between the individual and government.
ser v. Pierce County, 95 Wash. App. 883, 893 n.ll, 976 P.2d 1279, 1284 (1999), rev. granted sub
nom. Weyerhaeuser v. Land Recovery, Inc., 139 Wash. 2d 1001 (1999), appeal dismissed as moot
(Feb. 10, 2000); see also Donald G. Hagman, The Vesting Issue: The Rights of Fetal Development
Vis a Vis the Abortion of Public Whimsy, 7 ENVTL. LAW 519, 525 (1977); Richard B.
Cunningham & David H. Kremer, Vested Rights, Estoppel and the Land Development Process, 29
HASTINGS L.J. 625 (1978) (discussing differences between vesting and nonconforming use).
Because nonconforming uses and vested rights are so different, it is not surprising that
nonconforming uses are not allowed while vested rights are. Obviously, it is far less problematic
for the government to have the power to prevent the continuation of an unlawful use than to
prevent the establishment of a currently lawful use. Not surprisingly, the government has
alarmingly broad power to prevent nonconforming uses as in Rhod-A-Zalea. Unfortunately,
courts sometimes fail to recognize this crucial continuation/establishment distinction, and
therefore confuse nonconforming use and vesting law; the result of this mix-up is often an
erroneous decision against vested rights. See, e.g., State v. Thomasson, 61 Wash. 2d 425, 378
P.2d 441 (1963). See also Elizabeth Lynne Pou, Municipal Corporations Zoning Good Faith
Expenditures in Reliance on Building Permits in a Vested Right in North Carolina, 49 N.C. L. REV.
197 (1970) (confusing nonconforming use and vested rights concepts); John S. Herbrand,
Annotation, Zoning: Building in Course of Construction as Establishing Valid Noncorming Use or
Vested Right to Complete Construction for Intended Use, 89 A.L.R. 3d 1051 (1979) (confusing
nonconforming use and vested rights concepts); ROBERT M. ANDERSON, AMERICAN LAW OF
ZONING 3D (1986) (confusing nonconforming use and vested rights concepts). It is a mistake to
equate nonconforming uses with vested rights and then conclude that government possesses the
same broad powers to thwart vesting as it does to abate nonconforming uses.
3. Paul J. Nadel, This Land Is Your Land... Or Is It? Making Sense of Vested Rights in
California, 22 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 791, 792 (1989).
4. See Walter F. Witt, Jr., Vested Rights in Land Uses-A View from the Practitioner's Per-
spective, 21 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 317, 317 (1986) (describing the volatility of vesting
issues). For a discussion of the enormous role of local politics in the land development process,
see infra notes 142-44.
5. See CHARLES L. SIEMON ET AL., VESTED RIGHT: BALANCING PUBLIC & PRIVATE
DEVELOPMENT EXPECTATIONS 3 (1982).
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Traditionally, there have been two legal models for vested rights:
the "majority" and "minority" rules. Under the majority rule, in
order to acquire a vested right and be protected from subsequent
changes in regulations, a developer must (1) make substantial expendi-
tures (2) in good faith reliance (3) on a validly issued building permit.'
The majority rule is based on fuzzy and unpredictable equity princi-
ples;7 it is the least protective of property rights among the vesting
models.
Under the second model, what we refer to as the "minority" rule,
a developer's rights vest to the applicable zoning and building ordi-
nances in effect on the date of project approval.' The minority rule is
based mostly on statute, but also on fuzzy equitable principles;9 it pro-
vides an intermediate level of vesting protection.
Most commentators agree that the majority and minority rules
provide little certainty.1" Adding to the confusion is the fact that the
majority and minority rules are sometimes indistinguishable.11 How-
ever, amidst all this vesting confusion, one state-Washington-
developed a "date certain" vesting doctrine.
In this Article we propose that there are actually three models for
vested rights in the nation, the majority and minority rules and the
Washington rule. 12 In the 1950s, Washington began following what
6. See John J. Delaney & Emily J. Vaias, Recognizing Vested Development Rights as Pro-
tected Property in Fifth Amendment Due Process and Takings Claims, 49 WASH. U. J. URB. &
CONTEMP. L. 27 (1996). This outstanding piece of scholarship is one of the most important
articles ever written about vested rights. John Delaney is perhaps the most prolific commentator
on this topic; several of his articles are cited throughout this Article. See also John J. Delaney,
Vesting Verities and the Development Chronology: A Gaping Disconnect?, 3 WASH. U. J.L. &
POL'Y 603 (Fall 2000) [hereinafter Vesting Verities].
7. The equity principles at the heart of the majority rule look to the fairness of the result.
See infra notes 91 and 157. Such a vague and pliable standard leads to uncertain outcomes. See
supra notes 104-10 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 123-26 and accompanying text.
9. See David Hartman, Risky Business: Vested Real Property Development Rights-The
Texas Experience and Proposals for the Texas Legislature to Improve Certainty in the Law, 30 TEX.
TECH. L. REV. 297 (1999).
10. The majority rule is "amorphous at best." Id. at 304 (1999) (citing DANIEL R. MAN-
DELKER, LAND USE LAW, § 6.12 (3d ed. 1993) [hereinafter MANDELKER]). Scholarly criticism
of the majority rule is chronicled in Hartman's article, id. at 311-13 nn.105-13 and accompany-
ing text.
11. See id. at 305 ("[Alttempts to delineate [the] majority and minority rules are futile");
see also Hanes & Minchew, supra note 2, at 407 ("unclear" whether Virginia follows the majority
or minority rule).
12. The third model is also followed by California and Texas. See infra notes 132-44 and
accompanying text. However, this Article refers to the third model as the "Washington rule" for
three reasons. The first reason is that Washington was the first state to provide strong vesting
protections, creating them by case law in the 1950s. California recognized third-model protec-
tions decades later in 1984. See CAL. GOV'T CODE § 66498 (West 1994); infra notes 135-41 and
accompanying text (discussing California law). Texas provided third-model vesting in 1989.
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commentators usually refer to as the minority rule,13 but we assert that
over the years our state's vesting doctrine has evolved into a distinct,
third model. As we will show, the Washington rule is not only dis-
tinct, it is superior.
In essence, the Washington rule protects a property owner's right
to have his or her land development proposal processed under the reg-
ulations in effect at the time a complete development permit applica-
tion is filed, regardless of subsequent changes in zoning or other land
use controls. In Washington, vested rights are derived from constitu-
tional principles,14 common law, 5 and statute. 6 To top it off, the
Washington legislature passed a unique vesting damages statute to
compensate property owners whose vested rights have been violated. 7
TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 481.143 (West & Supp. 2000). See infra notes 144-46 and accompa-
nying text (discussing Texas law). Second, Washington has a stronger vested rights doctrine
because it provides separate common law and constitutional foundations for vesting, not just
statutory protections. See infra notes 172-87 and accompanying text (discussing Washington's
common law doctrine); infra notes 287-307 and accompanying text (discussing separate constitu-
tional vesting doctrine). California and Texas have no such common law or constitutional doc-
trine. Third, this Article is primarily about Washington's vested rights doctrine, so we refer to
the "Washington rule" for the sake of clarity.
13. Many commentators, and a few Washington cases, claim that Washington follows the
minority rule, but closer inspection shows that Washington's doctrine is, in fact, unique.
14. See infra notes 288-97 and accompanying text. The fact that vested rights are constitu-
tionally based serves as the foundation for the conclusion in this Article that a constitutional
vested rights doctrine exists separately from the vesting statute. See infra notes 287-307 (dis-
cussing constitutional doctrine).
15. See infra notes 173-228 and accompanying text.
16. WASH. REV. CODE § 58.17.033 (1998). This statute applies to the vesting of plat
applications. A second vesting statute, Revised Code of Washington (RCW) § 19.27.095,
applies to the vesting of building permits. The two statutes are almost identically worded. The
building permit vesting statute is not often invoked because a building permit is the last permit
needed to finish a project. See infra note 48 (discussing why the vesting of building permits is
less important than the vesting of earlier permit applications). Because the building permit
statute is rarely invoked and is almost identical to the plat vesting statute, this Article refers only
to the plat vesting statute, RCW § 58.17.033, as "the vesting statute."
17. See infra notes 282-87 (discussing RCW § 64.40). Vested rights in Washington can
also be derived by contract. Under RCW § 36.70B.170 (1998), a developer and a local govern-
ment can enter into a development agreement that, among other things, specifies vesting issues.
This Article, however, does not analyze vested rights pursuant to development agreements.
They are rarely used in small-scale development such as Mrs. Kennedy's proposed subdivision.
See infra notes 24-42 and accompanying text (describing the Mrs. Kennedy hypothetical). Also,
the analytical focus of this Article is that Washington's vested rights doctrine is a combination of
common-law, statutory, and constitutional protections; analyzing contractual protections (espe-
cially rarely used ones) would reduce the clarity of our analysis. For a general discussion of other
states' development agreement statutes, see Hartman, supra note 9, at 306-08; JULIAN CONRAD
JUERGENSMEYER & THOMAS E. ROBERTS, LAND USE PLANNING AND CONTROL LAW, §
5.31, at 240-43 (1st ed. 1990); Barry R. Knight & Susan P. Schoettle, Current Issues Related to
Vested Rights & Development Agreements, 25 URB. LAW. 779, 787-96 (1993); MANDELKER,
supra note 10, § 623, at 233-34; Nadel, supra note 3, at 813-18; Robert M. Rhodes & Cathy M.
Sellers, Vested Rights: Establishing Predictability in a Changing Regulatory System, 20 STETSON
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Washington's vested rights doctrine leads the nation in protect-
ing development-related constitutional rights. 8 It is not surprising
that Washington, a renowned trailblazer in the protection of individ-
ual liberties,19 is once again ahead of its time. Other states should
adopt Washington's vested rights doctrine because its strong protec-
tions benefit both citizens and government by creating certainty and
enforcing fairness, while at the same time allowing municipalities flex-
ibility to exercise their health, safety, and welfare powers.2 ° In addi-
tion, both landowners and local governments benefit from strong
vesting protections, because they are not consumed with lengthy and
costly court battles.
This Article is primarily a comprehensive, practitioner-oriented
analysis of Washington's vested rights doctrine. However, in order to
fully present our state's doctrine, several other related topics must be
L. REV. 475, 508-10 (1991).
18. The Washington Supreme Court noted, "our State's [vested rights] doctrine is already
one of the most protective of developer's rights." Erickson & Assocs., Inc. v. McLerran, 123Wash. 2d 864, 875, 872 P.2d 1090, 1096 (1994). See also RICHARD L. SETTLE, WASHINGTON
LAND USE AND ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND PRACTICE, § 2.7(b), at 41 (1983) (compared toalmost every other state, Washington "adheres to a far more permissive vesting doctrine.").
This Article reveals that Washington's vested rights doctrine is, indeed, the most protective of
constitutional rights in the nation. The only other states that come close to providing strong
protection for vested rights are California and Texas. See supra notes 9, 132-45 and accompany-
ing text.
19. State v. Gunwall, 106 Wash. 2d 54, 59 n.3, 720 P.2d 808, 811 (1986) (quoting RobertF. Utter, Freedom and Diversity in a Federal System: Perspectives on State Constitutions and the
Washington Declaration of Rights, 7 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 491, 499 (1984)); see also Daniel
J. Clark, Dropping Anchor: Defining a Search for Compliance with Article I, Section 7 of the
Washington State Constitution, 21 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1, 2 (1997) ("While many state constitu-tions mirror the language of the U. S. Constitution, Washington's constitution is unique.");
James M. Dolliver, Condemnation, Credit, and Corporations in Washington: 100 Years of JudicialDecisions-Have the Framers' Views Been Followed?, 12 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 163, 171(1989) (framers of Washington constitution "expressed concern over ... the protection of indi-vidual liberties."); Brian Snure, Comment, A Frequent Recurrence to Fundamental Principles:
Individual Rights, Free Government, and the Washington State Constitution, 67 WASH. L. REV.
669, 675, 681, 688-89 (1992); Hugh D. Spitzer & Charles W. Johnson, Themes and Variations,
21 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 997, 998 (1998) (book review); James W. Talbot, Comment, Rethinking
Civil Liberties Under the Washington State Constitution, 66 WASH. L. REV. 1099, 1100 (1991)("[I]n several ways the Washington State Constitution provides greater protection of civil liber-
ties [than the federal constitution]").
20. The term "health, safety, and welfare" is purposefully used instead of "police power"throughout this Article to avoid confusion about which kind of regulations can trump vested
rights. Later in this Article, we explain that local governments can still impose valid (that is, rea-
sonable) health, safety, and welfare regulations (e.g., fire protection standards) on a vested proj-ect. However, activities that can be regulated under the "police power," are much broader than
activities subject to "health, safety, and welfare" regulations. Aesthetics, for example, can beregulated under the "police power," but would not be considered a "health, safety, and welfare"measure. In our opinion, non-health-related police powers do not trump vested rights, so to
avoid confusion, we use the more precise term "health, safety, and welfare" regulations when dis-
cussing regulations that can trump vested rights.
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presented to put Washington's law in perspective. Part II of this Arti-
cle describes the basic process of land development to provide an
understanding of how vested rights issues actually arise. To better
illustrate the importance of vested rights, Part II introduces the reader
to Mrs. Kennedy, a real-life-based hypothetical property owner seek-
ing to develop her land into a small residential subdivision. This part
also describes the public policy conflict that gives rise to the vested
rights doctrine: certainty for the property owner in the development
approval process versus the protection of public health, safety, and
welfare by allowing new regulations to be applied to current projects.
Part III describes the weak vesting protections provided elsewhere in
the nation by analyzing the majority and minority vesting rules. Part
IV, the heart of the Article, dissects Washington's vested rights doc-
trine. The authors also provide suggestions for clearer interpretations
of Washington's unique vesting statute. This section also analyzes the
previously overlooked and rarely argued constitutional vested rights
doctrine that supplements Washington's statutory and common law
protections. Finally, Part V concludes by reemphasizing why the
Washington rule provides the best model for vested rights in the
nation.
II. A BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE LAND DEVELOPMENT PROCESS
The costs, risks, and number of steps in the land development
process have exploded in recent years.21 Land use regulations are
changing with greater frequency than ever before.22 Predictably, more
regulatory steps and quickly changing standards mean more vesting
issues.23 A fair and effective vested rights doctrine must take into
account the nature of the development process. To fully appreciate
how the vested rights doctrine affects the property owner, one must
first understand the process by which land is developed.
21. In the past few years, "Washington has undergone a sea change with respect to land use
regulation." Erickson & Assocs. v. McLerran, 123 Wash. 2d 864, 875, 872 P.2d 1090, 1096
(1994). See also Hanes & Minchew, supra note 2, at 389 ("Following World War II, land devel-
opment became an intensely regulated process requiring compliance with a host of complex land
use regulations and the issuance of multiple governmental approvals prior to ground-breaking.")
(footnote omitted); Cunningham & Kremer, supra note 2, at 625; SIEMON, supra note 5, at 3.
22. See SIEMON ET AL., supra note 5, at 3.
23. "Vested rights issues arise more frequently today than in the past because of ever
increasing volatility of land use regulations .... [L]ocal governments have become extremely
creative in extending the scope of their police powers to address real and perceived concerns
relating to population, transportation, and public facilities." Hanes & Minchew, supra note 2, at
377.
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A. Introducing Mrs. Kennedy
To illustrate how the development process works, look for a
moment at our hypothetical landowner, Mrs. Kennedy.24 She is a
retired educator whose personal retirement plan included making
small installment payments over the years on a twenty-five acre parcel
of property in Washington." Her property is undeveloped and near
the boundary of a medium-sized town. Mrs. Kennedy seeks to subdi-
vide the property into twenty-five separate one-acre lots and sell the
approved lots to a builder, who will ultimately build twenty-five sin-
gle-family homes.
Mrs. Kennedy must begin the development process by filing a
preliminary plat application with the municipality in which the prop-
erty lies. 6 Overall, the preliminary plat application is "essentially a
map of the general layout of the proposed subdivision. '"27 Even
though it is only a "general layout" map, a preliminary plat applica-
tion is very detailed. It must show how, for example, the project pro-
vides for open space, drainage, streets, and sidewalks.2" To prepare
the preliminary plat, Mrs. Kennedy must hire a surveyor and an engi-
neer with land planning capabilities, which costs several thousand
dollars.
24. Mrs. Kennedy is a hypothetical person, but the facts of her situation are very common.
Mrs. Kennedy is based on a real person who was a client of one of the authors in an amicus
curiae brief to the Washington Supreme Court on a vesting issue.
25. This is what we call a "401(k) development," meaning that the property owner is not a
professional developer but rather a retirement investor. Mrs. Kennedy's 401(k) project is much
more common than the reader might think; a surprisingly large amount of development in
Washington is undertaken by small 401(k) investors, not giant corporate developers. See, e.g.,
Association of Rural Residents v. Kitsap County, 141 Wash. 2d 185, 4 P.3d 115 (2000) (proper-
ty owned by family partnership of nondevelopers).
26. For general descriptions of the land development process in Washington, see Friends of
the Law v. King County, 123 Wash. 2d 518, 528-29, 869 P.2d 1056, 1062 (1994); Norco
Constr., Inc. v. King County, 29 Wash. App. 179, 180-81, 627 P.2d 988, 990 (1981), modified,
97 Wash. 2d 680, 649 P.2d 103 (1982).
For general descriptions of the development process nationwide, see John H. Delaney, Vested
Rights and the Development Chronology: 1994 Update, C930 ALI-ABA 697 (1994); John J.
Delaney & William Kominers, He Who Rests Less, Vests Best: Acquisition of Vested Rights in
Land Development, ST. LouIs U. L.J. 219, 221-22 (1979); Timothy E. DePalma, Developers'
Vested Rights, 23 URB. L. ANNUAL 487, 488-94 (1982); Hanes & Minchew, supra note 2, at 379-
82; Hartman, supra note 9, at 299-300; Craig A. Jaslow, Understanding the Doctrine of Equitable
Estoppel in Florida, 38 U. MIAMI L. REV. 187, 189 (1994). See also Delaney & Vains, supra note
6.
27. Norco Constr., Inc., 29 Wash. App. at 180, 627 P.2d at 990.
28. RCW § 58.17.110(1) requires a preliminary plat to contain details showing adequate
provision is made for "open spaces, drainage ways, streets or roads, alleys, other public ways,
transit stops, potable water supplies, sanitary wastes, parks and recreation, playgrounds, schools
and schoolgrounds [and] sidewalks." A typical plat application covers dozens of regulatory
topics.
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After receiving the preliminary plat application, the planning
staff of the municipality reviews the hundreds of details in the appli-
cation to ensure that it complies with current regulations.29 Months
later, the planning staff makes a recommendation to the local govern-
ment's legislative body,3 1 which would be a county council in Mrs.
Kennedy's case. The county council will conduct a public hearing and
then approve, disapprove, or conditionally approve the application."1
In Mrs. Kennedy's case, let's say the county council condition-
ally approves the application. 2 The council conditions approval on
Mrs. Kennedy setting aside ten acres of open space; she can now only
build fifteen, instead of twenty-five, one-acre lots. Mrs. Kennedy
reluctantly accepts the space condition and proceeds with the project,
hoping to recapture some value from her investment.
Preliminary plat approval in hand, Mrs. Kennedy contracts with
a professional developer. He surveys out the lots, builds the streets,
and installs utility main lines in conformity with the preliminary plat.
The streets, utility mains, and other infrastructure must be donated to
the public at no cost upon final plat approval.33 To finance the soon-
to-be public infrastructure she is paying for, Mrs. Kennedy takes out a
substantial loan and secures it with the property.
Because Mrs. Kennedy has complied with the preliminary plat
(e.g., actually set aside the ten-acres of open space, built the streets,
etc.), the county council grants final plat approval. Thereafter, the
lots depicted on the now-final plat are legal parcels and can be sold. 4
At this point, Mrs. Kennedy sells the platted lots to a homebuilder.
Preliminary plat approval is only the beginning of the develop-
ment process. Numerous other stand-alone regulatory schemes pep-
per the process. Mrs. Kennedy's project must comply with county
29. WASH. REV. CODE § 58.A.070 (1998). "A preliminary plat of proposed subdivisions
and dedications of land shall be submitted for approval to the legislative body of the city, town,
or county within which the plat is situated." Id. The legislative body of the municipality dele-
gates plat review duties to its planning staff.
30. WASH. REV. CODE § 58.17.100 (1998).
31. Id.
32. Conditional approval is the most common outcome. Usually the municipality's plan-
ning staff informally suggests numerous changes to a preliminary plat application, almost all of
which increase the cost of the project. The property owner often incorporates those suggestions
into an amended application. If the property owner fails to incorporate them, the planning staff
will almost certainly recommend conditional approval with the planning staffs "suggestions"
serving as the conditions. Planning staffs' recommendations are usually followed by busy local
elected officials.
33. WASH. REV. CODE § 58.17.165 (1998). See generally Nelson v. Pacific County, 36
Wash. App. 17, 671 P.2d 785 (1983) (describing process of dedicating private property to public
in platting process); Knudsen v. Patton, 26 Wash. App. 134, 611 P.2d 1354 (1980) (same).
34. WASH. REV. CODE § 58.17.200 (1998).
[Vol. 23:10431050
2000] Vested Rights 1051
wetlands regulations, drainage manuals, landscaping ordinances, water
and sewer line standards, street construction specifications-the list
goes on and on."5 Hundreds of these platting and stand-alone stand-
ards must be satisfied before the lots can be sold.
Yet another set of regulations must be satisfied before building
on the platted (but vacant) lots. The homebuilder must submit the
blueprints of the proposed home to the county building department
for the building permit approval.36 The blueprints must comply with
thousands of extremely detailed standards in the building code. If
the blueprints comply with all these standards, the building depart-
ment issues a building permit.38 While the home is being built,
county building officials inspect the job as it progresses to ensure that
it is being constructed in conformity with the building permit.3 9 Only
then is the house ready for sale to the public.
No description of the land development process would be com-
plete without acknowledging the enormous role played by politics.4"
35. To get a flavor for the multitude of regulatory requirements involved in the develop-
ment process, see generally WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 197-11-960 (1999) (SEPA checklist).
36. WASH. REV. CODE § 19.27.095 (1998). See generally Williams v. Thurston County,
100 Wash. App. 330, 997 P.2d 377 (2000) (describing building code compliance inspections).
37. See generally WASH. REV. CODE § 19.27.010 (1998). Municipalities adopt the Uni-
form Building Code by reference. WASH. REV. CODE § 19.27.031(1) (1998).
38. WASH. REV. CODE § 19.27.095 (1998).
39. See generally Williams v. Thurston County, 100 Wash. App. 330, 997 P.2d 377 (2000).
40. "Politics has always played a part in land-use law." Patricia E. Salkin, Land Use in the
21st Century: Political Challenges and Opportunities, LAND USE L. & ZONING DIG., May 1999
at 3. See Donwood, Inc. v. Spokane County, 90 Wash. App. 389, 395, 957 P.2d 775, 778 (1998)
(describing local governments' land use regulatory power as a "broad constitutional grant of
political authority .... ") (emphasis added). The fact that a Washington court has characterized
the land use approval process as part of a local government's "political authority" should dispel
any myth that politics plays no role in the development approval process.
One Washington case provides a stunning illustration of the politics behind many antidevel-
opment land use decisions. In Mission Springs, Inc. v. Spokane County, 134 Wash. 2d 947, 954
P.2d 250 (1998), an applicant vested to land use standards allowing a large apartment building.
Id. at 952, 954 P.2d at 252. Neighbors opposed the already-approved and lawful project and, at
the next election, put politicians in power who similarly opposed the apartment project. When
the property owner began construction, the newly elected city council members decided not to
grant the property owner a routine, nondiscretionary grading permit to start the project. Id. at
957, 954 P.2d at 254. The city attorney told the new council members that denying the grading
permit would violate the city charter, state statute, and the federal Constitution. Id. at 955, 954
P.2d at 253. After learning that denying the permit would violate all these laws, the new antide-
velopment mayor amazingly asked, "I want to know what the downside is." Id. at 956, 954 P.2d
at 254. Proving that courts are needed to rectify local politicians' occasional unconstitutional
actions, the property owner eventually won a statutory and constitutional damages suit. Id. at
972, 954 P.2d at 262.
Justice Talmadge, in his dissent opposing the reversal of the city council's decision in Mission
Springs, wrote that politics is a "power struggle." Id. at 985 n.12, 954 P.2d at 268 (Talmadge, J.,
dissenting) (citation omitted). Justice Talmadge is correct in a sense, but he failed to acknowl-
edge that in the development process "power struggle," the local government-not the property
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To put it mildly, "[l]ocal governments generally are not reluctant to
use [restrictive land use regulations] to mollify complaints sounded by
the electorate."41  Perhaps in the old days, when local governments
generally wanted growth, politics favored property owners.42 This is
not the case any more. Now, politics usually work against property
owners. For example, if a group of neighbors does not want new
houses near them, they might exert pressure on local elected officials.
Using "environmental protection" or "growth management" as cover,
local politicians may respond by attempting to prevent the develop-
ment.
Changing the previous Mrs. Kennedy hypothetical to factor in
the local political process, suppose that after she submitted her com-
plete preliminary plat application, the county council-caving in to
political pressure from a handful of neighbors who do not want new
houses near them--decided to pass a new "antisprawl" ordinance.
The new ordinance increases the minimum lot size in the area around
Mrs. Kennedy's property from one acre to five acres. Suddenly, under
the new rules, Mrs. Kennedy's twenty-five acre parcel can only be
divided into a total of five five-acre lots, just one-fifth of the twenty-
owner-has all the power. While it is true that the property owner in Mission Springs eventually
won, it took years of litigation and a trip to the state supreme court to vindicate its right to obtain
a routine grading permit. Remember: after being advised by his own counsel that his decision
would violate the city charter, a statute, and the federal constitution, the local politician's only
question was, "I want to know what the downside is." Id. at 956, 954 P.2d at 254.
41. Hanes & Minchew, supra note 2, at 377 (footnote omitted). See generally Daniel J.
Curtin, Jr. & M. Thomas Jacobson, Growth Control by the Ballot Box: California's Experience,
24 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1073 (1991) (describing how local governments respond to political pres-
sures by imposing restrictive land use regulations); Delaney & Kominers, supra note 26, at 219-
20 (permitting process described as a "war" between developers and politically powerful anti-
growth neighborhood groups); DePalma, supra note 26, at 499 n.68 ("traditional zoning disputes
are generally conflicts between private parties [neighbors and developers], the public welfare is
usually subordinated to the interests of the groups of litigants.") (citation omitted); R. ROBERT
LINOWES & DON T. ALLENSWORTH, THE POLITICS OF LAND-USE LAW: DEVELOPERS VS.
CITIZENS GROUPS IN THE COURTS (2d ed. 1976) (describing politics of land development
process); John W. Witt & Janis Sammartino-Gardner, Growth Management v. Vested Rights:
One City's Experience, 20 URB. LAW. 647, 647-48 (1988) (describing how political pressures
caused a local government to impose restrictive regulations).
Politics plays a role not only in land use permitting decisions by local governments, but also
in the resolution of vested rights cases by some courts. See Cunningham & Kremer, supra note
2, at 668 (constitutional protections such as vested rights should not vary with latest political
trends); SIEMON, supra note 5, at 10 (vesting protections from courts vary with popular trends in
economics and politics).
42. Decades ago developers "could swagger as ostentatiously as robber barons when it came
to developing whatever and whenever they wished." Donald G. Hagman, Estoppel and Vesting in
the Age of Multi-Land Use Permits, 11 Sw. U. L. REV. 545, 578 (1979). But, with the explosion
of regulations and antidevelopment political pressures, developers "have more need for [vesting]
protection now than they did [then]." Id.
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five one-acre lots allowed under the rules in effect when she applied.
Here is where the vested rights doctrine steps in.
In Washington, the vested rights doctrine protects Mrs. Ken-
nedy from changes in the rules after her preliminary plat application
has been submitted. That is, Mrs. Kennedy "vests" to the regulations
in effect (one-acre lots) on the date she submitted her complete pre-
liminary plat application.
B. Building Permits Are Outdated: The Growing Trend Toward
Multiple Permit Approvals
Decades ago, when few, if any, controls existed on the develop-
ment of land, a single building permit was the only permit needed to
build a massive office building.43 This is when the vested rights doc-
trine was born; it provided that an application or approval for a
building permit triggered vesting.44 The majority rule (and sometimes
the minority rule) still looks primarily to a building permit to trigger
vesting.45
Looking to building permits to trigger vesting protections is no
longer appropriate today.46 For instance, in our example of Mrs. Ken-
nedy, the building permit was granted only after plat application and
hundreds of stand-alone standards were met. Commentators criticize
a building-permit focused vested rights doctrine as outdated because
43. See, e.g., Hull v. Hunt, 53 Wash. 2d 125, 126-27, 331 P.2d 856, 856-57 (1958) (build-
ing permit approval necessary to build twelve-story apartment building). Developers must still
comply with zoning laws, but these do not technically constitute a "permit."
44. Ogden v. City of Bellevue, 45 Wash. 2d 492, 275 P.2d 899 (1954).
45. Cunningham & Kremer, supra note 2, at 644-45.
46. See Leroy Land Dev. Corp. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 543 F. Supp. 277, 281
(D. Nev. 1982) (looking only to the building permit stage to vest rights not "consistent with the
realities of modem land development practices"); Cunningham & Kremer, supra note 2, at 627
(cases focusing solely on building permits "are generally unsuited to resolution of the complexi-
ties presented by modern, multiphase, large-scale projects which represent a period of several
years and perhaps millions of dollars in planning, preparation, and land acquisition costs");
DePalma, supra note 26, at 493 ("Hence, the developer today faces an approval process that has
grown from a one-step nuisance control device [building permit] into a multiple-permit approval
system of uncoordinated and overlapping veto points lodged in a variety of agencies, each with
its limited sphere of regulatory authority.") (footnote omitted); Hanes & Minchew, supra note 2,
at 390 ("In spite of the development of this multiple approval process, many courts have contin-
ued to hold that the validly issued building permit remains as the principal benchmark for
satisfaction of the governmental act requirement.") (footnote omitted); Hagman, supra note 2, at
537, 550 (focusing solely on building permits "may have been appropriate in the past." How-
ever, "[i]t is further not obvious to me why a building permit should be regarded as some kind of
talisman regardless of the amount of construction occurring before and after that permit."); see
also WASHINGTON REAL PROPERTY DESKBOOK Zoning § 97.8(2)(c) ("Many local governments
have adopted provisions and procedures for a variety of preliminary approvals prior to building
permits. These include such things as site plan review, design review, and other discretionary
manners.").
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the modern development process is far more complex47 and requires
dozens of permits.48 In fact, the building permit is now the last permit
issued, not the first.49
To show how multiple approvals can affect vested rights, Profes-
sor Hagman describes the development process as "65 stop and go
lights.""0 Noting that one large project51 required 65 permits from 12
separate agencies, Professor Hagman described each of the 65 permits
as a separate stoplight; failure to obtain one of the 65 permits would
end the entire project.
The developer gets to finish the [project] only if 65 stop and go
lights, all set at random, turn green as the developer goes
through. The odds are not good. Regardless of the cost of driv-
ing through the first 64, one still only has a 50 percent chance of
hitting the 65th when it is green.
One may well doubt whether the [majority] vesting rule, which
evolved in an era of one, or a few stop and go lights, is appropri-
ate in a world with many. 2
Now that the development process has been described, one can
see that a property owner would greatly value a vested rights doctrine
that assured the 65th light would not suddenly turn red. In sum, the
building-permit focused vesting rule of the past needs a "make over"
to be current with the modern development approval process.
47. Cunningham & Kremer, supra note 2, at 635 n.33.
48. DePalma, supra note 26, at 493 ("[T]he developer today faces an approval process that
has grown from a one-step nuisance control device [building permit] into a multiple-permit
approval system of uncoordinated and overlapping veto points lodged in a variety of agen-
cies .. ") (footnotes omitted); see also Cunningham & Kremer, supra note 2, at 644-48; Hanes
& Minchew, supra note 2, at 389; Hagman, supra note 42, at 572-73.
Site plans, for example, have replaced many of the old functions of a building permit. See
JUERGENSMEYER & ROBERTS, supra note 17, § 5.28, at 231-32 (site plan is "seen by some as
having 'virtually replaced the building permit as the most vital document in the development
process ....") (footnote omitted); WASHINGTON REAL PROPERTY DESKBOOK, Zoning, §
97.8(2)(c) ("Many local governments have now adopted provisions and procedures for a variety
of preliminary approvals prior to building permits. These include such things as site
plans .... "). The vesting of site plans is discussed infra, notes 275-77 and accompanying text.
49. Cunningham & Minchew, supra note 2, at 634.
50. Hagman, supra note 2, at 538.
51. The permitting of the project at issue in Professor Hagman's example, a petrochemical
plant, is admittedly more complex than most residential or commercial projects, but conceptually
the analogy applies with equal force to common projects such as Mrs. Kennedy's.
52. Hagman, supra note 2, at 538.
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C. Two Competing Policy Interests: Fairness to the Property Owner
Versus Protecting Public Health, Safety, and Welfare
Before analyzing the different vesting models in the nation, we
must also examine the public policy conflict that sets the stage for the
vested rights doctrine. The vested rights doctrine is a legal mecha-
nism that chooses who wins in the conflict between the property
owner and the local government.53 Traditionally, when a weak vested
rights doctrine is applied, this conflict has been counterproductive to
both the government and landowners.54 However, a strong vested
rights doctrine balances these two competing policy interests. This
Article will show that it is not necessary for one party to be the abso-
lute winner on this issue: both municipalities and developers can win
by following the Washington rule.
1. The Certainty Provided by Protecting Vested Rights Benefits
Both Property Owners and Local Government
The Washington Supreme Court recognizes that "[s]ociety suf-
fers if property owners cannot plan developments with reasonable
certainty, and cannot carry out the developments they begin." 5  A
commentator adds, "[b]oth landowners and governments are ill-served
by [weak vesting protections] and often are forced to make business
and policy decisions involving land use without knowing what the
ultimate effect of these will be."5 6
In the strongly worded warning of Professor Hagman, the lack of
vested rights "is an open invitation to lawlessness on the part of the
53. Nadel, supra note 3, at 792 ("In all real estate development projects, an inherent conflict
exists between the private land developer's need for certainty and predictability in the govern-
mental approval process during development and the concern of local government agencies with
issues of public health, safety and welfare."). See also DePalma, supra note 26, at 487; MAN-
DELKER, supra note 10, § 612, at 223-24; Witt & Sammartino-Gardiner, supra note 41, at 648.
For a discussion of Washington law on the competing policy interests at stake, see MANDELKER,
supra note 10, at 158. See also infra notes 165-69 (discussing Washington courts' resolution of
the policy conflict from vested rights).
54. See Witt, supra note 4, at 327-28.
55. West Main Assocs. v. City of Bellevue, 106 Wash. 2d 47, 51, 720 P.2d 782, 785
(1986).
56. Hanes & Minchew, supra note 2, at 407-08 (footnote omitted). See also Wendy U.
Larsen & Steven M. Elrod, An Update on Vested Rights, LAND USE L., Aug. 1983, at 4 ("For the
sake of preserving both public and private resources, it is essential that an exact point be deter-
mined at which the developer can be certain that all unlawful requirements have been met and
the project can be finished as planned without the fear of having to meet new requirements.");
Knight & Schoettle, supra note 17, at 786 (strong vesting statutes "alleviate uncertainties and
problems associated with municipal approval of development projects which resulted in wasted
resources, increased land prices, and discouraged investors.") (footnote omitted).
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government.""7 Another commentator asserts that society has a gen-
eral interest in the certainty protected by the vested rights doctrine."8
Thus, vested rights further society's interest in the government fol-
lowing the law and establishing certainty.
As previously described, the present land development process
takes an enormous amount of time and money. Therefore, it is under-
standable that a property owner needs some assurances that she will be
able to complete her development. Interest payments on development
loans mean (almost literally) that time is money. 9 In addition, with-
out clear vesting rules, landowners must enforce their rights in court, a
lengthy and costly undertaking that many property owners cannot
afford.6" Consequently, building projects are halted or, at best,
delayed, wasting huge sums of money," primarily on interest pay-
ments.62 In addition, as a direct result of the uncertainty of a weak
vesting doctrine, the cost of development increases and housing need-
lessly becomes less affordable for low- and middle-income families.63
In the legislation reauthorizing its strong vesting statute, the Texas
Legislature summed the situation up well when it observed that the
lack of adequate vesting protections "result[ed] in unnecessary govern-
mental regulatory uncertainty that inhibit[ed] the economic develop-
ment of the state and increas[ed] the cost of housing," thereby often
57. Hagman, supra note 42, at 574. Professor Hagman's warning cannot be dismissed on
the theory that he is simply "pro-developer." As he described his philosophy, "Property rights
per se are not high on my personal list of major causes for concern." Hagman, supra note 2, at
520.
58. Lynn Ackerman, Searching for a Standard for Regulatory Takings Based on Investment-
Backed Expectations: A Survey of State Court Decisions in the Vested Rights and Zoning Estoppel
Areas, 36 EMORY L.J. 1219 (1987) (government has a constitutional interest in "certainty in the
law").
59. Delays cost money. See Norco Constr. Inc. v. King County, 29 Wash. App. 179, 184,
627 P.2d 988, 991 (1981) ("A common complaint of subdividers and developers everywhere is
that plat review procedures often involve harmful and expensive delay.").
60. See SIEMON ET AL., supra note 5, at 2. The costs of vested rights litigation also affect
local governments-both their defense costs, and the possible award of attorney's fees to devel-
opers if the municipality is held to have violated the developer's vested rights. See Mission
Springs, Inc. v. City of Spokane, 134 Wash. 2d 947, 972, 954 P.2d 250, 262 (1998) (award of
attorney fees against city under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 and RCW § 64.40.020 for denial of vested
rights).
61. For examples of costly delays, see DePalma, supra note 26, at 487 n.1.
62. See Norco Constr., Inc., 29 Wash. App. at 183, 627 P.2d at 991 ("with interest pay-
ments growing and patience declining" property owners filed suit to enforce vested rights).
63. Cunningham & Kremer, supra note 2, at 711; Frederick D. Huebner, Washington's
Zoning Vested Rights Doctrine, 57 WASH. L. REV. 139, 150 (1981); Hagman, supra note 2, at 544;
SIEMON ET AL., supra note 5, at 3. Washington's legislature has consistently decried the afford-
able housing crisis. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 43.180.010 (1998) ("[I]t is declared to be the
public policy of the state and a recognized governmental function to assist in making affordable




"causing decreased property and related values, bankruptcies, and
failed projects. '"64
Just as the development process takes time and money for devel-
opers, it is also burdensome for local governments. Most comprehen-
sive land use plans take months or years to complete and cost huge
sums of taxpayers' money. Vesting-related legal battles waste enor-
mous sums of money in litigation costs and waste other valuable gov-
ernment resources.65 Local governments do not benefit when, after
years of costly planning, the resulting development standards can be
changed overnight and applied to pending development projects.66
Therefore, local governments have an interest in sticking to their land
use plans. Vested rights allow a local government to know that its
land use plans have meaning. Several scholars specifically point to the
benefits of strong vesting protections enjoyed by local governments.67
2. Protection of Public Health, Safety, and Welfare
At first blush, the vested rights doctrine allows land uses that
contravene the public's power to protect health, safety, and welfare.
In other words, the vested rights doctrine allows a land use that would
not be lawful but for the legal protections the doctrine provides. For
example, if an elected body thinks the public health, safety, and wel-
fare requires less housing density, it exercises its regulatory powers
and passes a new antisprawl ordinance increasing minimum lot sizes.
However, under a strong vested rights doctrine, a property owner who
vested to the old ordinance can still build homes at the previously
allowed lot size. Some would say the vested rights doctrine allows
developers to be exempt from public health, safety, and welfare regu-
lations.6"
64. TEX. Loc. GOV'T CODE ANN. ch. 245 (West 1998 & Supp. 2000) (previously H.B.
1704, 76th Leg. (Tex. 1999)).
65. Seesupranote6l.
66. The common reason local governments sometimes radically change their land use
standards, despite their obvious interest in stable planning, is the political pressure asserted on
local politicians. See supra notes 40-42 and accompanying text.
67. Hagman, supra note 2, at 533; Hartman, supra note 9, at 302 (strong vesting protections
lauded as "promoting economic development while at the same time increasing the ability of
municipalities to sustain ordered growth.") (footnote omitted); Rhodes & Sellers, supra note 17,
at 510 (strong vesting protections "lend desirable predictability to the regulatory system; as such,
they benefit both the [property owner] and the government official charged with administering a
program"); SIEMON ET AL., supra note 5, at 10 ("The result of [weak vesting protections] is that
the development community and the public sector are forced to act in an atmosphere of uncer-
tainty, risk, and contention, with inevitable conflicts and disappointments.").
68. See generally Weyerhaeuser v. Pierce County, 95 Wash. App. 883, 892, 976 P.2d 1279,
1284 (1999), rev. granted sub nom Weyerhaeuser v. Land Recovery, Inc., 138 Wash. 2d 1001
(1999), appeal dismissed as moot (Feb. 10, 2000) (discussing competing public policies of the
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The truth, however, is that vested rights are not an exemption
from valid health, safety, and welfare regulations. Contrary to the
popular myth, the vested rights doctrine is not a loophole granting
developers an "exemption" from the law. Vested rights do not guar-
antee project approval.69 Instead, vested rights merely provide a
developer the right to have an application considered under the rules
and regulations in effect at the time he submitted his application-no
more, no less.
There are several limits on vested rights to ensure that the public
interest can be carried out. Because vested rights only protect a citizen
from changes in the existing law after a development application has
been submitted, it is not surprising that the vested rights doctrine does
not affect a person's obligation to follow the laws existing before the
change. For example, there is no vested right to ignore state environ-
mental statutes7° such as SEPA." Under SEPA, a local government
has the discretion to deny a vested land use application because of
adverse environmental impacts even if the application meets all other
non-SEPA requirements.72
Vested rights may also be terminated by reasonable legislation
enacted to protect public health, safety, and welfare. 3 As early as
vested rights doctrine).
69. "The right which vests.., is not the right to [project] approval." Norco Constr., Inc.
v. King County, 29 Wash. App. 179, 191, 627 P.2d 988, 995 (1981), modified, 97 Wash. 2d 680,
649 P.2d 103 (1982). See also Eastlake Comm. Council v. Roanoke Assocs., Inc., 82 Wash. 2d
475, 481-82, 513 P.2d 36, 41 (1973); Carlson v. Town of Beaux Arts Village, 41 Wash. App.
402, 406, 704 P.2d 663, 665 (1985); West Main Assocs. v. City of Bellevue, 106 Wash. 2d 47,
53, 720 P.2d 782, 786 (1986); Valley View Indus. Park v. City of Redmond, 107 Wash. 2d 621,
642, 733 P.2d 182, 195 (1987); Friends of the Law v. King County, 123 Wash. 2d 518, 528, 869
P.2d 1056, 1062 (1994).
70. Adams v. Thurston County, 70 Wash. App. 471, 481, 855 P.2d 284, 290 (1993)
("Vesting of development rights at the time of application or submittal does not defeat the Coun-
ty's discretionary ability to condition or deny any plat based on environmental impacts.") (foot-
note omitted); West Main Assocs., 106 Wash. 2d at 53, 720 P.2d at 786 (1986) ("[U]nder the
State environmental Policy Act of 1971 a municipality has the discretion to deny an application
for a building permit because of adverse environmental impacts even if the application meets all
other requirements and conditions for issuance") (citation omitted). See also Eastlake Comm.
Council, 82 Wash. 2d at 487, 515 P.2d at 44. For a description of how the procedural require-
ments of the SEPA statute affect the process by which a local government must evaluate a land
use application, see id. at 492, 515 P.2d at 46.
The effect of the vested rights doctrine on SEPA is discussed infra notes 72-73.
71. "SEPA" stands for the State Environmental Policy Act. WASH. REV. CODE ch.
43.21C (1998). See generally RICHARD L. SETTLE, THE WASHINGTON STATE ENVIRONMEN-
TAL POLICY ACT, A LEGAL AND POLICY ANALYSIS (1987, cum. supp. 1999).
72. Polygon Corp. v. Seattle, 90 Wash. 2d 59, 578 P.2d 1309 (1978).
73. See Huebner, supra note 63, at 146. Note, we do not claim vested rights may be ter-
minated by any conceivable "police power" regulation, such as an ordinance governing aesthet-
ics. See supra note 20 (discussing use of term "police power" versus "health, safety, and wel-
fare"). Note also that only a reasonable health, safety, and welfare regulation can terminate a
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1905, the Washington Supreme Court held, "[T]here is no such thing
as an inherent or vested right to imperil the health or impair the safety
of the community."74 Examples of ordinances related to public health,
safety, and welfare that Washington courts have held to trump vested
rights are ones relating to on-site sewage disposal systems, health
ordinances, railroad safety, and fire protection ordinances. 5
Vested rights are not "scofflaw" rights, so it is not surprising that
the vested rights doctrine "does not suggest that existing [preapplica-
tion] zoning ordinances, rules and regulations may be ignored. 7 6
Furthermore, the vested rights doctrine does not allow the continu-
ance of a nonconforming use, 77 excuse the failure to obtain a permit, 71
allow a person to violate a new postapplication ordinance 79 or any
other ordinance," or authorize the violation of permit conditions."
vested right. See infra note 74.
74. City of Seattle v. Hinkley, 40 Wash. 468, 471, 82 P. 747, 748 (1905). See also West
Main Assocs., 106 Wash. 2d at 53, 720 P.2d at 786 ("Municipalities can regulate or even extin-
guish vested rights by exercising the police power reasonably and in furtherance of a legitimate
public goal.") (citing Hass v. City of Kirkland, 78 Wash. 2d 929, 931, 481 P.2d 9, 10 (1971));
WASHINGTON REAL PROPERTY DESKBOOK, Zoning § 97.8(2)(d), at 97-45 ("Generally Wash-
ington courts have refused to apply vested rights to rules and regulations which are health and
safety related .... ") (citation omitted); Heubner, supra note 63, at 147 ("Vested rights to develop
land may also be terminated by legislation enacted to protect public health or safety which has
the effect of prohibiting a proposed development.") (footnote omitted).
The fact that valid health, safety, and welfare regulations trump vested rights does not mean
that local governments can pass any "police power" regulation they want to cleverly thwart vest-
ing. There are strict limits on what qualifies as a valid health, safety, and welfare regulation. See
West Main Assocs., 106 Wash. 2d at 52, 720 P.2d at 786 (health, safety, and welfare regulations
must be reasonable); Norco Constr. Inc. v. King County, 97 Wash. 2d 680, 685, 649 P.2d 103,
106 (1982) (use of health, safety, and welfare power cannot be unreasonable; giving local govern-
ment discretion to determine what qualifies as need for regulation without any criteria violates
due process); Carlson, 41 Wash. App. at 407, 704 P.2d at 664.
A health, safety, and welfare regulation that prevented vesting would be carefully scrutinized
by a Washington court. See infra note 203.
75. See generally Ford v. Bellingham-Whatcom County Dist. Bd. of Health, 16 Wash.
App. 709, 588 P.2d 821 (1977) (on-site sewage disposal system health ordinance); Hass v. City
of Kirkland, 78 Wash. 2d 929, 481 P.2d 9 (1971) (fire protection ordinance); DeTamore v.
Hindley, 83 Wash. 322, 145 P. 462 (1915) (railroad overpass safety ordinance); City of Seattle v.
Hinkley, 40 Wash. 468, 82 P. 747 (1905) (fire escape safety ordinance); see also WASHINGTON
REAL PROPERTY DESKBOOK, Zoning § 97.8(2)(d).
76. Norco Constr., Inc. v. King County, 29 Wash. App. 179, 192, 627 P.2d 988, 996
(1981), modified, 97 Wash. 2d 680, 649 P.2d 103 (1982).
77. Rhod-A-Zalea & 35th, Inc., v. Snohomish County, 136 Wash. 2d 1, 16, 959 P.2d 1024,
1032 (1998). See supra note 2 (discussing nonconforming uses).
78. Rhod-A-Zalea, 136 Wash. 2d at 17, 959 P.2d at 632.
79. Valley View Indus. Park v. City of Redmond, 107 Wash. 2d 621, 660, 733 P.2d 182,
207 (1987).
80. Hass, 78 Wash. 2d at 931, 481 P.2d at 10-11 (vested right to standards in building code
not a license to violate fire protection ordinance).
81. City of Mercer Island v. Kaltenbach, 60 Wash. 2d 105, 108, 371 P.2d 1009, 1012
(1962).
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There is also no vested right to build to standards contained in an
unlawfully passed ordinance. 2
Additionally, vested rights do not permanently shield developers
from new laws. While the vested rights doctrine protects a citizen
from postapplication changes to development regulations, it does not
freeze the law in time.83 For example, no one has a "vested right" to
be immune from zoning laws because his or her parcel of property was
platted in the 1890s, before zoning laws existed.84 One of the reasons
a vested right does not freeze the law in place forever is that all land
use permits expire after a period of years.85 Local governments can
require construction to commence in a reasonably short period of time
after permit approval. In addition, local governments may respond to
new emergencies" 6 by adopting a valid interim building moratorium
87
or interim zoning ordinance. 8 In sum, there are several controls on
vesting to ensure that the government retains the ability to exercise its
reasonable health, safety, and welfare powers when necessary. This
creates a good balance between the needs of local governments and
property owners.
82. Juanita Bay Valley Community Ass'n v. City of Kirkland, 9 Wash. App. 59, 73, 510
P.2d 1140, 1149 (1973) (because issuance of permit violated SEPA statutory procedural require-
ments, no vested right to proceed under illegally issued permit).
83. Bishop v. Town of Houghton, 69 Wash. 2d 786, 792, 420 P.2d 368,372 (1966) (zoning
designations not static). See also Lincoln Shiloh Assoc., Ltd. v. Mukilteo Water Dist., 45 Wash.
App. 123, 127, 724 P.2d 1083, 1086 (1986) (laws not static); DePalma, supra note 26, at 487 n.4.
84. 1998 Op. Wash. Att'y Gen. No. 4; 1996 Op. Wash. Att'y Gen. No. 5.
85. See Eastlake Community Council v. Roanoke Assocs., Inc., 82 Wash. 2d 475, 479, 513
P.2d 36, 40 (1973) (permit expired by its own terms); Noble Manor Co. v. Pierce County, 133
Wash. 2d 269, 281, 943 P.2d 1378, 1384 (1997) (long plats expire after 5 years under WASH.
REV. CODE § 58.17.170). See generally WASHINGTON REAL PROPERTY DESKBOOK, Zoning §
97.8(2)() (describing how permits expire); Hagman, supra note 42, at 563 (arguing that permits
should expire after a reasonable period of time). Short plats, however, are not subject to the five-
year expiration period. Noble Manor v. Pierce County, 133 Wash. 2d 269, 282, 943 P.2d 1378,
1385 (1997).
86. See Norco Constr., Inc. v. King County, 97 Wash. 2d 680, 890, 649 P.2d 103, 109
(1982); Jablinske v. Snohomish County, 28 Wash. App. 848, 851, 626 P.2d 543, 545 (1981).
87. Norco Constr., Inc. v. King County, 29 Wash. App. 179, 186, 627 P.2d 988, 992-93
(1981), modified, 97 Wash. 2d 680, 649 P.2d 103 (1982). Of course, the vested rights doctrine
protects the right to build when an application is submitted before a moratorium takes effect.
Friends of the Law v. King County, 63 Wash. App. 650, 651-52, 821 P.2d 539, 540 (1991), rev.
denied, 119 Wash. 2d 1006, 832 P.2d 488 (1992).
88. Interim zoning is authorized by statute but contains limitations to ensure that it is used
only for actual emergencies. See WASH. REV. CODE § 36.70A.390 (1998) (public hearing re-
quired; interim controls expire after six months). See generally SETTLE, supra note 18, at 45 for a
discussion of how interim zoning affects vesting in Washington State.
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III. THE VESTED RIGHTS DOCTRINE IN THE
REST OF UNITED STATES
Now that the need for vested rights and the competing policy
interests at issue have been discussed, the three models for vesting
protection can be analyzed in their proper context. This Part first
describes the majority and minority rules. In addition, it describes
how states have responded to problems arising from weak vesting case
law by enacting legislation. After the flaws in these models have been
highlighted, the reader will be able to more fully appreciate the
strengths of the third model, the Washington rule.
A. Majority Rule: Fuzzy Equitable Principles Lead to
Unpredictable and Harsh Results
As previously mentioned, the majority rule of vested rights is
premised on equitable principles. The most common description of
the majority rule provides that "a landowner will be protected when:
(1) relying in good faith, (2) upon some act or omission of the govern-
ment, (3) he has made substantial changes or otherwise committed
himself to his substantial disadvantage prior to a zoning change." 9
Forty states9 -- depending on how you count them9 1-adhere to the
majority rule. 92
The majority rule has many varieties.93 It is a combination of
equity and constitutional principles.94 The two concepts are so inter-
89. Delaney & Vaias, supra note 6, at 31 (footnote omitted).
90. Id. at 40-44 (lists each state). See also Erickson & Assocs. v. McLerran, 123 Wash. 2d
864, 868, 872 P.2d 1090, 1093 (1994) ("overwhelming" number of states adhere to majority
rule).
91. Because the majority rule is so fuzzy, it is often difficult to tell whether a state adheres
to the majority or minority rule. For example, one commentator concludes that it is "unclear"
whether Virginia follows the majority or minority rule. Hanes & Minchew, supra note 2, at 407-
08. Another commentator concludes that the two rules blend, making "attempts to delineate
majority and minority rules futile." Hartman, supra note 9, at 304 (footnote omitted). This Arti-
cle will not attempt to sort out the majority and minority rules; they are presented merely to
show how sharply they contrast with the Washington rule.
92. See supra note 90. The final tally is: majority rule (38 states), minority rule (6 states),
Washington rule (3 states: Washington, California, and Texas), and no cases on vested rights (3
states).
93. Commentators disagree about how many prongs the majority rule has, as well as the
contents of each prong. See, e.g., Larsen & Elrod, supra note 56, at 4 (four prongs); DePalma,
supra note 26, at 500 (five prongs for Oregon majority rule); Delaney & Vaias, supra note 6, at 31
(3 prongs); MCQUILLAN MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 25.152, at 683 (3d ed. 1990) (three
prongs) (footnote omitted); Hanes & Minchew, supra note 2, at 386 (footnote omitted) (three
prongs); Cunningham & Kremer, supra note 2, at 649 (three prongs).
The fact that several scholarly commentators cannot agree on the number of prongs in the
majority rule, let alone what each prong is, shows that the majority rule is hopelessly unpredicta-
ble. How can a property owner tell if she has a vested right when several law professors cannot
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twined that commentators cannot agree on where equitable and
constitutional principles begin and end.9"
This Article will not scrutinize the majority rule, but will merely
note in passing that various strains of the majority rule look to the fol-
lowing factors to determine if a vested right exists: equity in general,96
estoppel,97 reliance in general,9" good faith,99 the government's con-
duct,1"0 the "new peril" subdoctrine, 101 laches, 112 and the "pending
zoning change" rule."°3
The majority rule is a jumbled mess of contradictory cases that
come to a wide range of unprincipled, subjective outcomes. Not sur-
prisingly, it has been criticized by every"0 scholar addressing the
agree on the number and content of the prongs in the test that is supposed to answer the ques-
tion?
94. Hartman, supra note 9, at 305.
95. Knight & Schoettle, supra note 17, at 780-81 (four sources for vested rights doctrine are
equitable estoppel, constitution, legislation, and contract (development agreements)); MANDEL-
KER, supra note 10, § 613 at 224 (The "[v]ested rights doctrine has a constitutional base."); Hart-
man, supra note 9, at 302; SIEMON ET AL., supra note 5, at 9 (identifying "vesting" and "zoning
estoppel" as the two types of rules; "It is often difficult to ascertain which of the two vesting rules
a court is employing. One reason for this confusion is that there is no consistent, discernible
difference between the two approaches, at least as they are applied"); Rhodes & Sellers, supra
note 17, at 476 ("Although the doctrines of equitable estoppel and vested rights arise from dis-
tinct theoretical bases, Florida courts have employed these concepts interchangeably.").
96. Roland F. Chase, Annotation, Retroactive Effect of Zoning Regulation, in Absence of
Saving Clause, on Pending Application for Building Permit, 50 A.L.R.3d 596 (1973) Herbrand,
supra note 2; Linda S. Tucker, Annotation, Activities in Preparation for Building as Establishing
Valid Nonconforming Use or Vested Right to Engage in Construction for Intended Use, 38
A.L.R.5th 737 (1996).
97. Cunningham & Kremer, supra note 2, at 651 ("The generally accepted rule of zoning
estoppel appears to place primary emphasis on the conduct of the landowner or developer rather
than the equally important conduct of the governmental body") (footnote omitted); Hagman,
supra note 2, at 523 (estoppel "supplies the theoretical basis for vested rights") (footnote
omitted); JUERGENSMEYER & ROBERTS, supra note 17, § 5.27, at 228 (vesting and estoppel
similar).
98. See Tucker, supra note 96, at 756; Ackerman, supra note 58, at 1235-37; DePalma,
supra note 26, at 497-505; JUERGENSMEYER & ROBERTS, supra note 17, § 5.28, at 228-30.
A reliance-focused vesting rule has been criticized as too "subjective." Ackerman, supra note 58,
at 1269; Hartman, supra note 9, at 305.
99. ROBERT M. ANDERSON, AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING § 6.13, at 478-81 (3d ed.
1986); Rhodes & Sellers, supra note 17, at 478-82.
100. Rhodes & Sellers, supra note 17, at 482-86. See also Huebner, supra note 63, at 162
(conduct of parties should not be an element).
101. Rhodes & Sellers, supra note 17, at 493-96.
102. Michael J. Yaworsky, Annotation, Laches as Defense in Suit by Governmental Entity to
Enjoin Zoning Violation, 73 A.L.R.4th 870 (1989).
103. Ackerman, supra note 58, at 1238; DePalma, supra note 26, at 503-05; Hagman, supra
note 42, at 564. Washington courts have specifically rejected the "pending zoning rule change"
variation of the majority rule. See Allenbach v. City of Tukwila, 101 Wash. 2d 193, 195-96, 676
P.2d 473, 474 (1984) (citing Hardy v. Superior Court, 155 Wash. 244, 284 P. 93 (1930)).
104. The authors of this Article could not find a single commentator who found that the
merits of the majority rule outweighed its disadvantages.
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topic." 5  They describe the majority rule as being "unenlightened 0 6
and "muddled,"'' 7 having "little predictive value,"'0 8  and so on. 10 9
After all, as one commentator noted, the good faith element of the
majority rule is a tricky standard to apply. "0
The majority rule has also been criticized by scholars for its
"harshness""' because it provides so little protection to property own-
ers. One commentator suggests the only thing predictable about the
majority rule is an unjust result."' One example of an unjust result is
illustrated in Oceanic California Inc. v. North Central Coast Regional
105. See, e.g., Cunningham & Kremer, supra note 2, at 626 ("Judicial reliance on the
[majority rule] vested rights doctrine, however, is unfortunately characterized by inconsistent
application and confused rationales."); Delaney & Vaias, supra note 26, at 248 (under majority
rule "there is a need for some clear and certain standard on which both sides may rely."); Hueb-
ner, supra note 63, at 148-49 ("vesting under the [majority] rule is both late and uncertain")
(footnote omitted); Jaslow, supra note 26, at 189 (neither property owner nor local government
knows if a project is truly vested); Larsen & Elrod, supra note 56, at 10 (under majority rule "the
rules and their applications vary depending on the personal philosophy and proclivity of the
court involved, the attitude of the local public toward the development industry, and plain good
luck."); JUERGENSMEYER & ROBERTS, supra note 17, § 5.30, at 238 ("The case-by-case, equita-
ble determinations of [majority] vested rights and estoppel are difficult to reconcile and result in
great uncertainty"); Pou, supra note 2, at 198 (majority rule has no "formula," determining
majority-rule good faith element "elusive"); Nadel, supra note 3, at 793 (majority rule only pro-
vides "modest assurances" of project completion).
106. Hagman, supra note 2, at 519.
107. SIEMONETAL., supra note 5, at 10.
108. Nadel, supra note 3, at 796. Perhaps the ultimate example of the unpredictable major-
ity rule comes from a Utah case holding that a builder vests-unless there is a "compelling, con-
travening public interest" in preventing the project. Western Land Equities, Inc. v. City of
Logan, 617 P.2d 388, 396 (Utah 1980). What could be a more unpredictable standard than a
"compelling, contravening public interest?"
109. For additional commentators' characterizations of the majority rule, see Delaney,
Vesting Verities, supra note 6, at 603 (2000) (majority rule is "a hodgepodge of ad hoc analyses
giving rise to rules based mostly on subjective standards and providing little in the way of reli-
able guidance to landowners and agencies involved in the development process."); Cunningham
& Kremer, supra note 2, at 710 ("arbitrary" and "inefficient"); Delaney & Vaias, supra note 6, at
32 ("little predictability," "often inconsistent and confusing," and "highly subjective") (footnotes
omitted); DePalma, supra note 26, at 510 (majority rule produces unprincipled outcomes); Hag-
man, supra note 2, at 536 (majority rule "not a clear one"); Hanes & Minchew, supra note 2, at
379 ("amorphous body of vested rights" law); Hartman, supra note 9, at 305-07 (majority rule
provides "few if any bright line rules,.., and the case law is inconsistent and confusing," result-
ing in "substantial injustices and hardships"); MANDELKER, supra note 10, § 6.12, at 224
("amorphous"); Tucker, supra note 96, at 757 ("inconsistent") Roland F. Chase, Annotation,
Retroactive Effect of Zoning Regulation, in Absence of Saving Clause, on Validity Issued Building
Permit, 49 A.L.R.3d (1973).
110. Hagman, supra note 41, at 575. See also Allenbach v. City of Tukwilla, 101 Wash. 2d
193, 198, 676 P.2d 473, 475 (Washington chose a date-certain test that "avoids the morass and
uncertainties of trial on 'good faith' and 'reliance."').
111. Hagman, supra note 2, at 522. See also Delaney, Vesting Verities, supra note 6, at 1
(majority rule "is generally insensitive to the uncertainties faced by landowners who must cope
with an increasingly complex land use approval process.")
112. Hartman, supra note 9, at 317 (footnote omitted).
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Commission,13 a California case applying the majority rule. In Oce-
anic, a local government issued a multitude of permits for a large proj-
ect, including building permits for some of the project) 14 The proper-
ty owner spent $27 million on property acquisition and engineering
costs, then the law suddenly changed." 5 Applying the majority rule,
the California court held that the property owner had no vested right
to proceed. 16
In another amazing case from California, Pardee Construction Co.
v. City of Camarillo,117 a local government entered into a stipulated
judgment providing that the regulations governing a particular project
would not be changed." Subsequently, a shift in local politics
brought a new attitude to the city council. 1 9 The city passed a new
ordinance changing the regulations applicable to the project, directly
violating the stipulated judgment it had entered into earlier.1 2° Politics
triumphed over the law; under the majority rule, the property owner
had no vested right to proceed.
1 21
One case summed up the majority rule well:
The mechanisms at work here combined to "protect" the envi-
ronment by protracted and undependable administrative proce-
dures followed by years of litigation. Only the most hardy and
well-heeled [property owner] can run so harsh a gauntlet. Bur-
dened by land costs, loan interest, architectural, engineering and
attorney fees, many entrepreneurs run out of money or heart or
both long before the finish line.
[T]he handmaiden of [this] prevailing administrative anarchy is
the [majority] vested rights rule ... [which allows] administra-
tive vacillation virtually up to the moment the builder starts• • 122pouring concrete.
113. 63 Cal. App. 3d 57 (1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 951 (1977).
114. Nadel, supra note 3, at 800-81 (discussing Oceanic California Inc.).
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. The unjustness of these two California common-law cases shows why the 1984 Cali-
fornia vesting statute was so needed. See infra notes 134-40 (discussing California statute).
118. Nadel, supra note 3, at 803-05 (discussing Pardee Constr. Co. v. City of Camarillo, 37
Cal. 3d 465, 690 P.2d 701 (1994)).
119. Id.
120. ' Id.
121. For other majority-rule horror stories, see Hartman, supra note 9, at 300-01; Hagman,
supra note 2, at 520-22.




B. The Minority Rule: A Little Better but Still Not Good Enough
The minority rule, followed by six states, 121 is a middle ground
position. As previously mentioned, Washington is generally listed as
a state adhering to the minority rule, but we will show in the next sec-
tion why Washington's doctrine is distinct.
Admittedly, the minority rule provides more certainty and fair-
ness than the majority rule. Under the minority rule, the regulations
in effect at the time of project approval are applied."4 However, the
minority rule is still fatally flawed. It allows regulators to change the
rules between the date of the project application and final approval, a
period of time often extending for months or years, forcing a property
owner to guess whether the project will ever be built. During this
guessing period, a property owner often expends huge sums of money
on engineering and consulting costs without knowing whether the
proposed project will still be permissible. Because the guessing period
is so long, it is difficult to know if a project is economically viable.
The guessing period also makes it more difficult for lenders to deter-
mine if the underlying property will ever be capable of producing
enough income to repay loans, let alone whether it will have any value
as collateral.
The minority rule, which is sometimes indistinguishable from
the majority rule,12 does not provide property owners with enough
certainty. Most of the cost and risk in developing property lies in the
preapproval phase (e.g., Mrs. Kennedy's preliminary plat). The
minority rule only provides certainty after project approval, that is,
after most of the cost and risk is over. However, by allowing property
owners to at least proceed with approved projects, the minority rule
gives property owners and financial lenders some limited certainty.
The minority rule means that a citizen need not worry about whether
he or she can proceed with an approved project. This provides very
little direction-what does an "approved" project mean if not the abil-
ity to complete the project? 26
123. ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 9-1202, 11-1202 (West 1997); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §
24-68-101 to 24-68-106 (West 1998); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 40A § 6 (1994); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 153A-344.1 (1999); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40:55 D-49 (West 1993); PA. STAT. ANN. TIT. 53 §
10508(4)(ii) (West 1997).
124. The minority rule is statutorily created. See supra note 123 and accompanying text.
125. See supra notes 11 and 91.
126. One is reminded of an episode of the television situation comedy Seinfeld. In it, Jerry
had a "reserved" rental car. When he arrives at the airport, he is told by the car rental clerk that
his "reserved" car has been rented to someone else. To paraphrase his question to the clerk,
"What does 'reserved' mean if you can give my 'reserved' car away?" Similarly, what does"approved" mean if the government can nonetheless halt your "approved" project?
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The unpredictability and harshness of both the majority and
minority rule led several states to enact legislation recognizing vested
rights. This next section will analyze such legislation.
C. Vested Rights Through Legislation
During the past decade, several states have enacted legislation
limiting the power of municipalities to apply new regulations to on-
going land development projects.127  These statutes were enacted to
alleviate uncertainties and problems associated with late vesting
rules. 128
While each state statute varies, most apply to procedures estab-
lished in the map, plan, or plat approval process.129  After careful
analysis of the statutes, they can basically be divided into two types:
approval statutes and application statutes. 3 ° The first type of statute
allows landowners to obtain vested rights after a landowner receives
approval from a local government.' These statutes carry out the
127. Eleven states have enacted vested rights legislation. The following provides a list of
states with vesting statutes: Arizona (ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 9-1202, 11-1202 (West 1997));
California (CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 66498.1-66498.9 (West 1994)); Colorado (COLO. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 24-68-101 to 24-68-106 (West 1998)); Florida (FLA. STAT. ANN. § 163.3167 (West
2000)); Massachusetts (MASS GEN LAWS ch. 40A § 6 (1994)); North Carolina (N.C. GEN.
STAT. §§ 153a-344.1, 160a-385.1 (1999)); New Jersey (N.J. STAT. ANN § 40:55D-49 (West
1993)); Pennsylvania (PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53 § 10508 (West 1997)); Texas (TEX. Loc. GOV'T
CODE ANN. § 245 (West 1998)); Virginia (VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-491 (Michie 2000)); Wash-
ington (WASH. REV. CODE § 58.17.033 (1998) (plat vesting), and 19.27.095 (building permit
vesting). The laws of two states (Florida and Virginia) fall short of being true "vesting statutes"
because they merely codify the elements of the majority rule. See infra note 130.
128. See Knight & Schoettle, supra note 17, at 786.
129. Id.
130. Two states have statutes that do not fit into these categories. Florida has a weak
vesting statute that merely recognizes majority rule vested rights in general. See FLA. STAT.
ANN § 163.3167 (West 2000). Virginia has chosen to codify the majority rule. See VA. CODE
ANN. § 15.1-49.1 (Michie 2000). The Virginia law provides that a landowner's rights vest and
are not subject to later enacted zoning ordinances when the landowner (1) is the beneficiary of a
significant affirmative governmental act allowing development of a specific project; (2) relies in
good faith on the act; and (3) incurs substantial obligations or expenses in pursuit of the specific
project.
131. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 9-1202, 11-1202 (West 1997) (protects rights established
in protected development right plan); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 24-68-101 to 106 (West 1998)
(protects developers for three years after local approval of a site-specific plan); MASS. GEN.
LAWS ch. 40A § 6 (1994) (protects holder of a building or special permit and approved subdivi-
sion from a zoning change if the permit was granted before notice was given of the zoning
change, if construction began within six months after the permit was issued and proceeded as
continuously and expeditiously as possible); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 153a-344.1 (1999) (approved
site-specific development plan protected for two years); N.J. STAT. ANN § 40:55D-49 (West
1993) (protects an applicant who receives preliminary subdivision or site plan approval from any
change in use requirements, and generally from any requirements applicable to layout or design,
for three years); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53 § 10508(4)(ii) (West 1997) (no subsequent change or
amendment in the zoning, subdivision, or other governing ordinance can be applied to adversely
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minority rule. As mentioned above in the section discussing the
minority rule, granting vesting rights after approval is not very protec-
tive of property rights and still leads to great uncertainty. Thus, for
our purposes, the application statutes are more beneficial to analyze
and compare to Washington. These statutes essentially codify the
Washington rule. 13 2
Texas and California are the two states with application statutes
similar to Washington.'33 Both states enacted such legislation because
their common law rules for vesting resulted in substantial hardship for
landowners.' 34
California was the first state to adopt legislation similar to that of
Washington. In 1984, the California legislature enacted the Vesting
Tentative Map statute. 3 ' The legislation was based on the view that
the "private sector should be able to rely upon an approved vesting
tentative map prior to expending resources and incurring liabilities
without the risk of having the project frustrated by subsequent action
by the approving local agency." '136 This was a breakthrough, because
several of the most unfair majority-rule cases came from California.
In California, any subdivision creating five or more parcels must
obtain a tentative subdivision map known as a "tentative map. 137
The Vesting Tentative Map statute permits the filing of a Vesting
Tentative Map (VTM) which, if accepted as complete, gives the
developer a vested right to proceed with its development in accordance
with the local ordinances, policies, and standards that are in effect at
the time the VTM is submitted. 3 ' A local government is required to
accept and process a VTM. 139 By simply stamping on the face of a
standard tentative map the words "Vesting Tentative Map," a devel-
affect the right of one with an approved plan for five years).
132. CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 66498.1-66498.9 (West 1994); TEX. Loc. GOV'T CODE ANN.
§ 245 (West 1998 & Supp. 2000).
133. See WASH. REV. CODE §§ 58.17.033, 19.27.095 (1998).
134. California enacted vested rights legislation due to the courts' reluctance to expand the
limited protections of the vested rights rule in California. See Hagman, supra note 2, at 793.
The Texas common law rule for vesting created hardships for property owners. See Hartman,
supra note 9, at 4.
135. Hagman, supra note 2, at 793.
136. Id. at 819. The California statute cited refers to an "approved" vesting tentative map.
Id. In California, an "approved" tentative map means an accepted "application." Therefore, the
use of the word "approved" in the California statute does not mean that it is a minority rule
("approval") statute; California has an "application" vesting statute.
137. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 66426 (West 1994).
138. Id.
139. DANIEL J. CURTIN, JR., CALIFORNIA LAND USE AND PLANNING LAW 72 (16th ed.
1996).
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oper gains the right to proceed with the development for a specified
period of time. 4'
Case law interpreting the California vesting statute reveals that
the statute is to be construed broadly. For example, a court has held
that a property owner was not required at his own expense to "under-
ground" existing off-site utilities, because at the time the property's
owner's map application was deemed complete, the regulations in
effect did not expressly require this expensive procedure.' In another
example, a court held that a landowner vests to the applicable impact
fees at the time the Vesting Tentative Map is deemed complete. 4 2 Be-
cause the Washington and California statutes are virtually identical,
Washington courts should follow California's lead and hold that
impact fees vest under the statute. 143
In 1987 Texas adopted a vested rights statute that provided for
early vesting of rights upon the filing of an initial permit application.
Before enacting the statute, Texas followed the majority rule, which
produced weak protections and unpredicted outcomes. 4 4 To remedy
uncertainty, the Texas statute provides that when a series of permits is
required for a development, and the original application for the first
permit in that series is filed, all permits required for the project should
be considered to be a single series of permits.'45 This language shows
how imperative it is that the vested right to develop property contin-
ues throughout the permitting process, including the several series of
permit approvals. In 1997 the Texas legislature inadvertently repealed
the Texas vested right statute. 146  However, at the next available
opportunity, the Texas legislature quickly reenacted it.'47
In essence, Washington has been a trailblazer for states like Cali-
fornia and Texas, which have adopted vesting legislation similar to
140. Id. at 71.
141. Bright Development v. City of Tracy, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d 618 (1994). "To 'under-
ground' means 'to lay utility cables below ground level." Id. at 620 n.1 (citing 9 OXFORD
ENGLISH DICTIONARY 1073).
142. Kaufman v. City of Modesto, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 904 (1994).
143. A Washington court seems to have declined to accept our suggestion. In New Castle
Investments v. City of LaCenter, 98 Wash. App. 224, 989 P.2d 569 (1999), rev. denied, 140 Wash.
2d 1019, 5 P.2d 9 (2000), the court held that impact fees do not vest. (For a detailed discussion
of New Castle, see infra note 252).
144. See Hartman, supra note 9, at 409.
145. TEX LOc. GOV'T CODE ANN. ch. 245 (West Supp. 2000) (previously H.B. 1704,
76th Leg. (Tex. 1999)).
146. See Ralph K.M. Haurwitz & Ben Wear, Inadvertent Repeal of Law Puts City, Devel-
opers in Limbo, AUSTIN AMERICAN-STATESMAN, July 24, 1997, at Al. Apparently, a typo-
graphical error referring to the Texas vesting statute in an omnibus repealer bill repealed the law.
147. TEX. LOc. GOV'T CODE ANN. ch. 245 (West 1998 & Supp. 2000) (previously H.B.
1704, 76th Leg. (Tex. 1999)).
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Washington's. In fact, California and Texas have used Washington's
law as a starting point. However, Washington still has the strongest
vesting law because, unlike California or Texas, Washington's vested
rights doctrine supplements its statutory protections with a long histo-
ry of strong common law and constitutional protections. Washington
also provides a statutory cause of action for damages resulting from
the denial of vested rights.'48
IV. WASHINGTON'S VESTED RIGHTS DOCTRINE
Now that the flaws of the majority and minority rules have been
examined, the reader can more fully appreciate the Washington rule.
This section will analyze the Washington rule in detail.
A. What the Washington Rule Is and Why It Was Created
While the details of the Washington rule are analyzed below, the
following is a general description of the rule. In Washington, "a land
use application ... will be considered only under the land use statutes
and ordinances in effect at the time of the application's submission." '149
The Washington rule does not look to fuzzy equity principles, as the
majority rule does. Instead, the Washington rule looks to a "date cer-
tain" to determine vesting. The Washington rule also differs from the
minority rule in that vesting occurs at the time of application, not
approval.
Washington courts provide three reasons why they chose the
Washington rule: certainty, fairness, and the Washington Constitu-
tion. In choosing the Washington rule, the courts have considered the
competing policy interests of landowners and local government and
developed a rule that balances both.'
Washington's vesting doctrine was created to increase adminis-
trative convenience and predictability. Washington courts have held,
"The purpose of the vested rights doctrine is to provide a measure of
certainty to developers and to protect their expectations against fluctu-
ating land use policy.''. As previously mentioned, certainty is not
148. See WASH. REV. CODE § 64.40 (1998) (discussed infra notes 281-86 and accompany-
ing text).
149. Noble Manor Co. v. Pierce County, 133 Wash. 2d 269, 275, 943 P.2d 1378, 1381
(1997) (citation omitted). This quote from Noble Manor describes protections of the plat-vesting
statute, but also accurately describes the protections of the common-law and the constitutional
vesting doctrines.
150. See infra notes 156-57 and accompanying text.
151. Noble Manor, 133 Wash. 2d at 278, 943 P.2d at 1383 (citations omitted). As another
Washington court put it:
The purpose of the vesting doctrine is to allow developers to determine, or 'fix,' the
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just good for developers; it is good for local governments'12 and the
law in general.153 As Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes wrote, "The ten-
dency of the law must always be to narrow the field of uncertainty.' 15
4
The Washington rule accomplishes this.
One of the ways the Washington rule narrows the field of uncer-
tainty is to establish a "date certain" for vesting. 55 The combination
of the contents of the application and the date it was submitted makes
it easy to determine which uses the property owner applied for and
which specific rights have accrued as a result.5 6 As the Washington
rules that will govern their land development. The doctrine is supported by notions
of fundamental fairness. As James Madison stressed, citizens should be protected
from the 'fluctuating policy' of the legislature. The Federalist No. 44, at 301 (J. Mad-
ison) (J. Cooke ed. 1961). Persons should be able to plan their conduct with reason-
able certainty of the legal consequences.
West Main Assocs. v. City of Bellevue, 106 Wash. 2d 47, 51, 720 P.2d 782, 785 (1986). See also
Eastlake Community Council v. Roanoke Assocs., Inc., 82 Wash. 2d 475, 484, 513 P.2d 36, 42
(1973); Norco Constr. Inc. v. King County, 29 Wash. App. 179, 189, 627 P.2d 988, 994 (1981),
modified, 97 Wash. 2d 680, 649 P.2d 103 (1982); Norco Constr., Inc. v. King County, 97 Wash.
2d 680, 684, 649 P.2d 103, 106 (1982) ("The need for a 'date certain' upon which a right vests is
to avoid tactical maneuvering between the parties ... "); Allenbach v. City of Tukwilla, 101
Wash. 2d 193, 198, 676 P.2d 473, 475 (1984) (Washington chose "a 'date of the application' test
that avoids the morass and uncertainties of trial on 'good faith' and 'reliance'); Valley View
Indus. Park v. City of Redmond, 107 Wash. 2d 621, 636, 733 P.2d 182, 191 (1987); Erickson &
Assocs, Inc. v. McLerran, 69 Wash. App. 564, 567, 849 P.2d 688, 690 (1993); Friends of the
Law v. King County, 123 Wash. 2d 518, 522, 869 P.2d 1056, 1059 (1994) (citation omitted);
Erickson & Assocs. v. McLerran, 123 Wash. 2d 864, 868, 872 P.2d 1090, 1093 (1994) (citation
omitted); Noble Manor Co. v. Pierce County, 81 Wash. App. 141, 145, 914 P.2d 417, 419
(1996), affd, 133 Wash. 2d 269, 943 P.2d 1378 (1997) (citations omitted); Schneider Homes,
Inc. v. City of Kent, 87 Wash. App. 774, 777, 942 P.2d 1096, 1098 (1997); Noble Manor Co. v.
Pierce County, 133 Wash. 2d 269, 278, 283, 943 P.2d 1378, 1383, 1386 (1997); Weyerhaeuser v.
Pierce County, 95 Wash. App. 833, 891, 976 P.2d 1279, 1284 (1999), rev. granted sub nom.,
Weyerhaeuser v. Land Recovery, Inc., 139 Wash. 2d 1001, (1999), appeal dismissed as moot
(Feb. 10, 2000); New Castle Investments v. City of LaCenter, 98 Wash. App. 224, 231, 989
P.2d 569 (1999) (citation omitted); Huebner, supra note 63, at 141 (footnote omitted).
152. See supra note 67. See also Hartman, supra note 9, at 302 (strong vesting protections
aid in "increasing the ability of municipalities to sustain ordered growth."); Huebner, supra note
63, at 162; Hagman, supra note 2, at 533 ("[W]hen the City of Monterey's own urban renewal
project was halted because of a change in the law. . . , the City squealed like a stuck pig all the
way to the California Supreme Court.") (discussing Urban Renewal Agency of the City of Mon-
terey v. California Coastal Zone Conservation Comm'n, 15 Cal. 3d 477 (1975)); SIEMON ET AL.,
supra note 5, at 10; Rhodes & Sellers, supra note 17, at 510-11.
153. Ackerman, supra note 58, at 1269 (state has constitutional interest in "concern for cer-
tainty in the law"). See generally Hartman, supra note 9, at 298-99 (quoting cases on the goal of
certainty in the law).
154. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, COMMON LAW 127 (1881).
155. Hull v. Hunt, 53 Wash. 2d 125, 130, 331 P.2d 856, 859 (1958).
156. Valley View Industrial Park, 107 Wash. 2d at 637, 733 P.2d at 192. For an example of
how Washington's date certain vesting rule can be easily applied, even to seemingly complicated
questions concerning which uses an application contemplated, see Westside Business Park v.
Pierce County, 100 Wash. App. 599, 5 P.3d 713, rev. denied, 141 Wash. 2d 1023, 10 P.3d 1075
(2000).
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Supreme Court described it, "we prefer to have a date certain upon
which the right vests .... We prefer not to adopt a rule which forces
the court to search through. . . 'the moves and countermoves of...
parties.. . .' The more practical rule to administer, we feel, is that the
right vests [upon application]." 157
Fairness is also a fundamental part of the Washington rule."'8
After all, when invoking the vested rights doctrine, "the property
owner is asking no more than official permission to use his or her land
in accordance with the ... laws." 59  As the Washington Legislature
put it, "it is unfair to penalize applicants that have submitted permit
applications that meet current requirements."' 6 °
The third purpose of the Washington rule is the protection of
constitutional rights.'6 ' Some cases couch the constitutional purpose
157. Hull, 53 Wash. 2d at 130, 331 P.2d at 859. See also Norco Constr., Inc. v. King
County, 97 Wash. 2d 680, 684, 649 P.2d 103, 106 (1982) (purpose of vested rights doctrine is to"avoid tactical maneuvering between [the] parties .... ") (citation omitted); Allenbach v. City of
Tukwilla, 101 Wash. 2d 193, 198, 676 P.2d 473, 475 (1984); Valley View Industrial Park, 107
Wash. 2d at 642, 733 P.2d at 195 (when property owner filed application, "it fixed, and firmly
imprinted upon the parcel, the zoning classification it carried at the moment of the filing."). See
also Carlson v. Town of Beaux Arts Village, 41 Wash. App. 402, 704 P.2d 663 (1985) (vague
approval standard of "best interests of the citizens" prevents property owners from having
certainty).
A commentator on Washington's vesting rule writes:
The rule of vesting the right to develop land on the date of application is easy to
apply. The Washington doctrine creates a mechanical standard-[] application com-
pliance, timeliness, and completeness. This standard makes it unnecessary for a court
to undertake a case-by-case inquiry into the fundamental vested rights issue of whe-
ther it is fair to divest a party of property expectations through retroactively applying
a subsequently effective zoning ordinance. By applying the mechanical rule in decid-
ing a case, a court can avoid the difficult inquiry. Rather, it may simply decide on
which side of the bright line a developer's permit application falls.
Huebner, supra note 63, at 148 (footnote omitted). See also Ackerman, supra note 58, at 1269-74
("It is helpful to have a specific point in time when all vesting analysis begins .... [Hlaving a
specific point in time that triggers vesting avoids much of the protracted maneuvering that often
characterizes zoning controversies .... [A date-certain vesting rule] would establish the kind of
certainty in the law that decreases the need for litigation.").
158. Huebner, supra note 63, at 155. The "fairness" component of Washington's vested
rights doctrine is different than the "equity" basis of the majority and minority rules. Washing-
ton's analysis focuses solely on fairness to the property owner, in a constitutional fundamental
fairness sense, whereas the majority and minority rules' "equity" analysis focuses on a balance of
interests of both the property owner and the government.
159. Norco Constr., Inc. v. King County, 29 Wash. App. 179, 190, 627 P.2d 988, 995
(1981), modified, 97 Wash. 2d 680, 649 P.2d 103 (1982).
160. Ch. 347, 1995 Wash. Laws § 101. (findings accompanying vesting-related amend-
ments to Growth Management Act).
161. Valley View Indus. Park, 107 Wash. 2d at 636, 733 P.2d at 191 ("due process consid-
erations require that developers be able to take recognized action under fixed rules governing the
development of their land"); Erickson & Assocs. v. McLerran, 123 Wash. 2d 864, 870, 872 P.2d
1090, 1093 (1994) ("Our vested rights cases thus establish the constitutional minimum: a 'date
certain' standard that satisfies due process requirements"); Norco Constr., Inc., 97 Wash. 2d at
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of the Washington rule in terms of how vesting provides citizens with
"fundamental fairness, ' '162 which is a due process concept.1 63  Other
cases point to the constitutional purpose of the Washington rule by
recognizing that the vested right to develop one's land is a valuable
property right protected by the due process clause. 64 Still other
Washington cases and commentators address the constitutional pur-
pose of Washington's vested rights doctrine by equating vesting pro-
tections with yet another due process concept, the prohibition against
retroactive legislation.1 6 5
The competing policy interests of the vested rights doctrine have
already been analyzed in general, but this section describes how
Washington law in particular has addressed the conflict. In a nutshell,
the Washington courts and legislature clearly recognize the two com-
peting interests, and have consciously chosen one side: that of the
property owner. 166 The Washington Supreme Court wrote:
Development [concerns] and the due process rights protected by
the vested rights doctrine come at a cost to the public interest.
The practical effect of recognizing a vested right is to sanction
684-85, 649 P.2d at 106 (when attempting to impose new standards on a project applicant,
"[d]ue process requires governments to treat citizens in a fundamentally fair manner"); West
Main Assocs. v. City of Bellevue, 106 Wash. 2d 47, 50, 720 P.2d 782, 785 (1986).
Washington courts have not specified whether it is the federal or state constitution at issue.
The constitutional principle protecting vested rights is the due process, not takings, clause. See
Knight & Schoettle, supra note 17, at 785; DePalma, supra note 26, at 487.
162. Vashon Island Comm. For Self Government v. Washington State Boundary Review
Bd. for King County, 127 Wash. 2d 759, 768, 903 P.2d 953, 957 (1995) (citation omitted); Noble
Manor Co. v. Pierce County, 81 Wash. App. 141, 145, 913 P.2d 417, 419 (1996) (citations omit-
ted) ("vesting doctrine is rooted in principles of fundamental fairness"), aff'd, 133 Wash. 2d 269,
943 P.2d 1378 (1997); Schneider Homes Inc. v. City of Kent, 87 Wash. App. 774, 778, 942 P.2d
1096, 1098 (1997).
163. See Erickson & Assoc., 123 Wash. 2d at 870, 872 P.2d at 1093 (fundamental fairness a
due process concept).
164. Valley View Industrial Park, 107 Wash. 2d at 636, 733 P.2d at 191 (citation omitted);
Erickson & Assoc., 123 Wash. 2d at 870, 872 P.2d at 1093. See also Delaney & Vaias, supra note
6, at 30; Hartman, supra note 9, at 303; Nadel, supra note 3, at 796.
165. Hardy v. Superior County of King County, 155 Wash. 244, 248, 284 P. 93, 95 (1930)
(statutes should be interpreted prospectively). See also Huebner, supra note 63, at 155 (fairness
of vested rights doctrine and prohibition against retroactive legislation similar); Cunningham &
Kremer, supra note 2, at 660 ("For several centuries the common law courts have therefore gen-
erally accepted the proposition that legislation that has such a retroactive effect is unfair and per-
haps unconstitutional"). See generally Ray H. Greenblat, Judicial Limits on Retroactive Civil
Legislation, 51 Nw. L. REV. 540, 540-44 (1956) (discussing retroactive legislation).
The economic efficiency fostered by strong vesting protections-that a property owner and
lender can rely upon the law on the books at the application stage is probably an unspoken pur-
pose behind the Washington rule. See generally Hagman, supra note 2, at 534 (discussing econ-
omic efficiencies of strong vesting protection).
166. See supra note 150 (protection of property rights) and note 131 (protection against
retroactive legislation).
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the creation of a new nonconforming use. A proposed develop-
ment that does not conform to newly adopted laws is, by defini-
tion, inimical to the public interest embodied in those laws. If a
vested right is too easily granted, the public interest is sub-
verted.
[However,] [t]his court recognized the tension between public
and private interests when it adopted Washington's vested
rights doctrine. The court balanced the private property and
due process rights against the public interest by selecting a
["date certain"] vesting point ....167
Washington's deliberate choice in favor of the property owner is
less one-sided than it might seem. Recall that vested rights do not
shield developers from valid health, safety, and welfare regulations or
SEPA, so the public interest can still be protected even with a strong
vested rights doctrine. 6  Because the public interest remains pro-
tected, the net effect of Washington's strong vested rights doctrine is
the protection of property owners' rights and expectations with no loss
of valid government powers. In fact, the only government power sac-
rificed by Washington's strong vesting protections is the ability of
local politicians' to retroactively prevent currently lawful-but politi-
cally unpopular-land uses.
Washington's vested rights doctrine appears to have succeeded
in balancing the two competing policy interests of the individual and
the government. As one commentator notes, "[t]he vested rights doc-
trine should balance the competing policy goals of eliminating waste-
ful risk and uncertainty in the land development permit process and
retaining sufficient local government flexibility to respond to changed
community conditions by rezoning. The present Washington [vested
rights] doctrine ... protects both of these goals.' 16 9
167. Erickson & Assocs. v. McLerran, 123 Wash. 2d 864, 873-74, 872 P.2d 1090, 1095-96
(1994). See also Adams v. Thurston County, 70 Wash. App. 471, 482, 855 P.2d 284, 291 (1993)
("The only real purpose served by the County's interpretation of the ordinance is to allow it to
change its zoning laws to defeat or modify a particular subdivision by delaying vesting until after
environmental review. The County argues that later vesting is a preferable policy. The Wash-
ington Legislature and Supreme Court disagree."); Noble Manor Co., 133 Wash. 2d at 280, 943
P.2d at 1384; Weyerhaeuser v. Pierce County, 95 Wash. App. 883, 892, 976 P.2d 1279 (1999),
1284, rev. granted, sub noma. Weyerhauser v. Land Recovery, Inc., 139 Wash. 2d 1001 (1999),
appeal dismissed as moot (Feb. 10, 2000).
168. See supra notes 73-75 and accompanying text.
169. Heubner, supra note 63, at 162.
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Given that local governments retain a wide assortment of regu-
latory powers immune from the vested rights doctrine,17 it is perfectly
reasonable to provide property owners all the certainty and fairness of
strong vesting protection. To do otherwise would dramatically tip the
balance of interests one-sidedly in favor of the government.
B. Detailed Analysis of the Washington Rule
The following section is organized into two 171 main parts, the
common-law vested rights doctrine and the vesting statutes that codify
the existing common law. For reasons described below, the common-
law doctrine continues to remain in force separately from, and sup-
plementary to, the statutes. However, for organizational clarity, the
following sections break Washington cases into two categories, pre-
1987 and post-1987, reflecting the effect of the 1987 plat-vesting stat-
ute.172
1. The Origins of the Common-Law Vested Rights Doctrine
The first 73 Washington vesting case, Odgen v. City of Bellevue,'74
was decided in 1954. In those days, a building permit was the only
permit necessary to finish a project.7 7 The Odgen court held that a
property owner vested to the "prevailing zoning ordinances" in effect
when he or she applied for a building permit. 176
The Odgen building permit-vesting rule was purely a common-
law judicial creation.1 77 The Odgen court did not claim to be directly
170. See supra notes 20, 68-88.
171. The third basis of Washington's vested rights doctrine, the constitutional doctrine, is
analyzed separately. See infra notes 288-308.
172. This Article does not provide summaries of each vesting case. Instead, the body of
law is analyzed by categories, such as the elements of each doctrine.
173. One case, claims that Hardy v. Superior Court, 155 Wash. 244, 284 P. 93 (1930) was
the first vesting case. See Valley View Indus. Park v. City of Redmond, 107 Wash. 2d 621, 636-
37, 733 P.2d 182, 191-92 (1987). Hardy did not apply the vested rights doctrine because the
property owners never applied for a plat or building permit; instead, Hardy is a straightforward
retroactive legislation case, merely holding that laws usually operate prospectively. See Hardy,
155 Wash. 244 at 248, 284 P. 93 at 95. Another case (correctly) states that Odgen v. City of
Bellevue, 45 Wash. 2d 492, 275 P.2d 899 (1954), was the first vesting case. See Friends of the
Law v. King County, 63 Wash. App. 650, 654, 821 P.2d 539, 541 (1991), rev. denied, 119 Wash.
2d 1006, 832 P.2d 488 (1992).
An earlier case, City of Seattle v. Hinkley, 40 Wash. 468, 82 P. 474 (1905), is sometimes cited
as a very early "vesting" case. It is not. Rather, Hinkley involved a nonconforming use, which is
different than vesting. See supra note 2.
174. Odgen, 45 Wash. 2d 492, 275 P.2d 899 (1954).
175. Seesupra note 46.
176. Ogden, 45 Wash. 2d at 496, 275 P.2d at 902 ("The [vested] right accrues at the time
an application for a building permit is made.")
177. Schneider Homes, Inc. v. City of Kent, 87 Wash. App. 774, 778, 942 P.2d 1096, 1098
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interpreting the constitution, 178 a statute, or previous Washington
cases;"' it simply announced a new rule of law. The main rationale
for Odgen was that a building permit in compliance with the applicable
laws must be issued "as a matter of right," rendering its issuance a
"ministerial" function.' The court contrasted such ministerial func-
tions with "discretionary" functions, which are the initial legislative
choices made by elected officials to establish standards, such as adopt-
ing a zoning code' According to the court after discretionary stand-
ards have been set, issuance of a permit in conformity with those
standards is ministerial, meaning that the local government now lacks
the power to decide not to apply the standards on the books. The
ministerial/discretionary distinction has continued through Washing-
ton common-law vesting cases.
Odgen is the foundation of Washington's common-law vesting
doctrine. Its black-letter law holding has been reaffirmed by numer-
ous Washington cases." 2 The next vesting case, Hull v. Hunt,"' more
(1997).
178. The closest the Odgen court came to invoking a constitutional basis for its holding was
a reference to art. 1, § 12, the Washington constitution's privileges and immunities clause.
Odgen, 45 Wash. 2d 492 at 495, 275 P.2d at 902. The court noted that forcing citizens to obtain
discretionary, as opposed to ministerial, permits would violate this constitutional protection. Id.
at 495, 275 P.2d at 902.
179. Odgen cited Hardy for the proposition that "A property owner has a vested right to use
his property under the terms of the zoning ordinance applicable thereto." Odgen, 45 Wash. 2d at
495, 275 P.2d at 901. As previously described, Hardy was a retroactivity case, not a vesting,
case. See supra note 172.
Odgen did not discuss the majority rule of vesting followed by other states; it simply




182. The principles of Odgen "have consistently been followed in [Washington] land use
permit cases." Norco Constr., Inc. v. King County, 29 Wash. App. 179, 188, 627 P.2d 988, 994
(1981), modified, 97 Wash. 2d 680, 649 P.2d 103 (1982). The pre-1987 vesting statute cases
repeating the Odgen holding are: Hull v. Hunt, 53 Wash. 2d 125, 128; 331 P.2d 856, 857 (1958);
Pearson v. Evans, 51 Wash. 2d 574, 576, 320 P.2d 300, 301 (1958); Pierce v. King County, 62
Wash. 2d 324, 335, 382 P.2d 628, 635 (1963); Bishop v. Town of Houghton, 69 Wash. 2d 786,
795, 420 P.2d 368, 374 (1967); Mayer Built Homes, Inc. v. Town of Steilacoom, 17 Wash. App.
558, 565-66, 564 P.2d 1170, 1174-75 (1977); Parkridge v. City of Seattle, 89 Wash. 2d 454, 464-
65, 573 P.2d 359, 365 (1978); Mercer Enter. v. City of Bremerton, 93 Wash. 2d 624, 627, 611
P.2d 1237, 1239-40 (1980); Teed v. King County, 36 Wash. App. 635, 643-44, 677 P.2d 179,
184 (1984); West Main Assocs. v. City of Bellevue, 106 Wash. 2d 47, 50-51, 720 P.2d 782, 785
(1986).
The post-1987 cases are Friends of the Law v. King County, 63 Wash. App. 650, 654, 821
P.2d 539, 541 (1991), rev. denied, 119 Wash. 2d 1006, 832 P.2d 488 (1992); Erickson & Assocs.
v. McLerran, 69 Wash. App. 564, 566, 849 P.2d 688, 690 (1993); Adams v. Thurston County,
70 Wash. App. 471, 475, 855 P.2d 284, 287 (1993); Erickson & Assocs. v. McLerran, 123 Wash.
2d 864, 867-68, 872 P.2d 1090, 1092-93 (1994); Noble Manor County v. Pierce County, 81
Wash. App. 141, 143, 913 P.2d 417, 418 (1996); Thurston County Rental Owners v. Thurston
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fully developed Odgen. 8 4  Specifically, Hull discussed the supposed
merits"'5 of the equity-based majority rule. 86 After carefully consider-
ing the majority rule used across the country, the Hull court
unequivocally rejected it:
Notwithstanding the weight of authority, we prefer to have a
date certain upon which the right vests to construct in accor-
dance with the building permit. We prefer not to adopt a rule
which forces the court to search through... 'the moves and
countermoves of... parties .... ' The more practical rule to
administer, we feel, is that the right vests when the [property
owner] applies for his building permit....' 8 7
Thus, Hull gave Washington its much coveted "date-certain"
vesting rule.
In the following decades, Washington vesting case law branched
out; the cases developed rules on what constitutes an "application,"
and addressed the competing public health and safety interests,
SEPA 88 issues, and many others. Each element of this body of law is
categorized and synthesized below.
2. Elements of Common-Law Vesting Doctrine
Professor Settle, undisputedly one of the most prominent com-
mentators on Washington land use law,"8 9 provides a two-part frame-
work for analyzing vesting: (1) what kinds of applications "trigger"
vesting, and (2) to which laws does an application vest? 9' We will call
them the "trigger" and "vest-to-what" questions. The reader should
County, 85 Wash. App. 171, 182, 931 P.2d 208, 214 (1997).
The fact that cases decided after 1987, the date of the plat-vesting statute, repeat and readopt
the holding of Odgen means that the common-law vesting doctrine articulated in Odgen is still in
force, even after the enactment of the statute.
183. Hull, 53 Wash. 2d at 125, 331 P.2d at 856.
184. Norco Constr., Inc., 29 Wash. App. at 189, 627 P.2d at 994 (citations omitted).
185. Hull described the rationale for the majority rule as "that the police power, exercised
for the benefit of the public as a whole, supersedes [a property owner's] permit." Hull, 53 Wash.
2d at 128-29, 331 P.2d at 858. This rationale, that the will of the public almost always super-
sedes private rights, is at odds with Washington's constitutional history. See supra note 19 (dis-
cussing Washington's broad state constitutional protections).
186. Hull, 53 Wash. 2d at 128-29, 331 P.2d at 858.
187. Id. at 130, 331 P.2d at 859 (emphasis added).
188. "SEPA" refers to the State Environmental Policy Act. WASH. REV. CODE ch.
43.21C (1998). See generally SETTLE, supra note 71.
189. Understating Professor Settle's stature, the Washington Supreme Court calls him "a
well-respected commentator on land use law." Presbytery of Seattle v. King County, 114 Wash.
2d 320, 323, 787 P.2d 907 (1990).
190. E-mail correspondence from Professor Richard Settle to the authors (Jan. 11, 2000)
(on file with authors) (to analyze vested rights properly "[y]ou have to distinguish between the
kinds of applications that trigger vesting and the regulations into which a proposal vests.").
1076 [Vol. 23:1043
Vested Rights
ask him- or herself these two questions while reading the following
description of Washington's vesting law. 9'
Washington's common-law vesting doctrine has three primary
elements.
In the ordinary course of events, a developer's right to develop
in accordance with a particular zoning designation vests only if
the developer files a building permit application that (1) is suffi-
ciently complete, (2) complies with existing zoning ordinances
and building codes, and (3) is filed during the effective period of
the zoning ordinances under which the developer seeks to
develop.' 92
The first element of a complete permit application addresses the"trigger" question. Washington's early vested rights doctrine sub-
stantially limited the kinds of applications that triggered a vested
right. The basic rule was (and still is) that ministerial permits vest,
while discretionary ones do not.'93 Therefore, a building permit appli-
cation triggers vesting because it is the quintessential ministerial per-
mit. 194
In the past, plat approval was thought to be a "discretionary" act
because it required approval from a local legislative body. Therefore,
191. The "trigger" and "vest-to-what" analysis applies to all forms of vesting: common-
law, statutory, and constitutional.
192. Valley View Indus. Park v. City of Redmond, 107 Wash. 2d 621, 733, 855 P.2d 182,
192 (1987). Even though decided in 1987, Valley View was a pre-1987 statute case. The case
was decided on February 12, 1987, and the plat-vesting statute became effective nearly five
months later, on July 1, 1987. See 1987 Wash. Laws § 214.
193. Odgen v. City of Bellevue, 45 Wash. 2d 492, 495, 275 P.2d 899, 901-02 (1954); Bes-
selman v. City of Moses Lake, 46 Wash. 2d 279, 280, 280 P.2d 689, 690 (1955); Wenatchee
Congregation of Jehovah's Witnesses v. City of Wenatchee, 50 Wash. 2d 378, 386, 312 P.2d
195, 200 (1957); Craven v. City of Tacoma, 63 Wash. 2d 23, 27, 385 P.2d 372, 375 (1963);
Pentagram Corp. v. City of Seattle, 28 Wash. App. 219, 225, 622 P.2d 892, 895 (1981); Carlson
v. Town of Beaux Arts Village, 41 Wash. App. 402, 406, 704 P.2d 663, 665 (1985); Lincoln
Shiloh Assoc. v. Mukilteo Water Dist., 45 Wash. App. 123, 127, 724 P.2d 1083, 1086 (1986).
But see Norco Constr. Inc. v. King County, 29 Wash. App. 179, 190, 627 P.2d 988, 994
(1981) (implying vesting applies to some discretionary permits: "The county and council argue
that the vesting rule in the land use permit cases is premised on the assumption that no discretion
is involved in cases where it is applied. That is incorrect."), modified, 97 Wash. 2d 680, 649 P.2d
103 (1982).
Allowing local governments "discretion" to do something as ministerial as processing a land
use application would be unconstitutional. Odgen, 45 Wash. 2d at 495, 275 P.2d at 902 (1954);
Eastlake Community Council v. Roanoke Assocs., Inc., 82 Wash. 2d 475, 482, 513 P.2d 36, 41-
42 (1973).
Washington's vested rights doctrine is based upon the view that land use permits are "mini-
sterial." Huebner, supra note 63, at 142. For a general description of "discretionary" versus
"ministerial" permits, see Hanes & Minchew, supra note 2, at 381; Cunningham & Kremer,
supra note 2, at 638-39.
194. Odgen, 45 Wash. 2d at 495, 275 P.2d at 902.
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in the past, plat applications did not vest.'95 This rule changed in
1987, and plat applications now vest.196 Rezoning is considered dis-
cretionary because it is a legislative act by a local government's elected
officials; 9 7 accordingly, applications for a rezone do not vest.19'
A property owner cannot obtain vested rights until he or she
submits an application. 199 An application must be "complete" to
vest.2"' The complete application requirement ensures that a court can
determine whether the application complies with the applicable stand-
ards and deters "permit speculation." 0 ' Local governments are
195. The court of appeals, in Norco Constr. Inc., 29 Wash. App. at 191, 627 P.2d at 995,
held that a preliminary plat application vests. The supreme court overruled the court of appeals
on that point and held that a plat application does not vest. Norco Constr. Inc. v. King County,
97 Wash. 2d 680, 687, 649 P.2d 103, 104 (1982). The legislature, however, had the last word. It
specified that a preliminary plat application does indeed vest. See WASH. REV. CODE §
58.17.033 (1998). See generally Noble Manor Co. v. Pierce County, 133 Wash. 2d 269, 281, 943
P.2d 1378, 1384 (1997) (discussing statutory vesting of short plats).
196. See WASH. REV. CODE § 58.17.033 (1998).
197. Bishop v. Town of Houghton, 69 Wash. 2d 786, 792, 420 P.2d 368, 372 (1966).
198. Besselman v. City of Moses Lake, 46 Wash. 2d 279, 280, 280 P.2d 689, 690 (1955);
Teed v. King County, 36 Wash. App. 635, 677, 943 P.2d 179, 184 (1984). See also Bishop, 69
Wash. 2d at 792, 420 P.2d at 372 (rezone discretionary).
This is not surprising, because a rezone is a future change in the law. The vested rights doc-
trine protects a citizen's right to have current rules applied to his or her land use application; it is
conceptually impossible to "vest" to a future change in the law. However, a local government's
refusal to rezone can be unlawful on nonvesting constitutional grounds. See, e.g., State ex rel.
Wenatchee Congregation of Jehovah's Witnesses v. City of Wenatchee, 50 Wash. 2d 378, 386,
312 P.2d 195, 199 (1957) (refusal to rezone held to be "arbitrary and capricious").
199. Mayer Built Homes, Inc. v. Town of Steilacoom, 17 Wash. App. 558, 565, 564 P.2d
1170, 1174 (1977); Parkridge v. City of Seattle, 89 Wash. 2d 454, 465, 573 P.2d 359, 366 (1978).
200. Valley View Indus. Park v. City of Redmond, 107 Wash. 2d 621, 656, 733 P.2d 182,
205 (1987).
An application can be "complete," even though postapplication information may still be
required, if the application complies with the previous ordinance; a local government's assurance
to a property owner that processing will still continue is also a factor. See Mercer Enterprises
Inc., v. City of Bremerton, 93 Wash. 2d 624, 631, 611 P.2d 1237, 1241 (1980). See also Valley
View, 107 Wash. 2d at 639, 733 P.2d at 193; Huebner, supra note 62, at 145.
An incomplete application can vest if it is later cured. Juanita Bay Valley Community v. City
of Kirkland, 9 Wash. App. 59, 83-84, 510 P.2d 1140, 1155 (1973). The rule allowing the curing
of an initially deficient application should not to be confused with the rule that an illegally
granted permit cannot be cured. Eastlake Community Council v. Roanoke Assocs., Inc., 82
Wash. 2d 475, 483, 513 P.2d 36, 42 (1973).
A local government's delay tactics to prevent an applicant from completing her application
can violate due process and allow a court to consider the application to be "complete" as of the
date it was originally submitted. See infra note 223.
201. Valley View, 107 Wash. 2d at 657, 733 P.2d at 205 (Dore, J. (dissenting)). "Permit
speculation" is the frowned-upon practice of applying for grandiose land uses without any real
intention of building the project. Once the permit is obtained for such a grandiose use, the value
of the land skyrockets and the speculator sells it for a windfall profit. By requiring the applicant
to spend the time and money necessary to submit a complete application, permit speculation is
eliminated. Washington courts realize that permit speculation is not a problem in the real world.
See Hull v. Hunt, 53 Wash. 2d 125, 130, 331 P.2d 856,859 (1958); Eastlake Community Council,
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allowed to define a complete application by ordinance, °2 but there are
limits on this power to ensure that such an ordinance does not become
an antivesting device.203
Pre-1987 Washington cases have held the following specific per-
mits "trigger" vesting: a building permit,24 a grading permit, 2 ' a
conditional use permit, 26 and a shoreline permit.27 The only thing
held not to vest under the pre-1987 common-law doctrine was a septic
permit, but that is debatable.208
The second element, compliance with existing laws, addresses
the "vest-to-what" question. A property owner's rights only vest to
82 Wash. 2d at 484, 513 P.2d at 43; Allenbach v. City of Tukwila, 101 Wash. 2d 193, 199, 676
P.2d 473, 476 (1984).
Commentators agree that due to the enormous costs of preparing land use applications, per-
mit speculation is not a problem. See Hagman, supra note 2, at 531.
202. Mercer Enterprises, Inc. v. City of Bremerton, 93 Wash. 2d 624, 628, 611 P.2d 1237,
1240 (1980); Friends of the Law v. King County, 63 Wash. App. 650, 654, 821 P.2d 539, 541
(1991), rev. denied, 119 Wash. 2d 1006, 832 P.2d 488 (1992) (local government's finding that
application was "complete" is final); Erickson & Assocs. v. McLerran, 123 Wash. 2d 864, 873,
872 P.2d 1090, 1095 (1994).
203. An ordinance cannot define a "complete application" so narrowly as to become an
antivesting device. Such ordinances must be consistent with constitutional and statutory require-
ments. See West Main Assocs. v. City of Bellevue, 106 Wash. 2d 47, 52, 720 P.2d 782, 786
(1986) (antivesting ordinances carefully scrutinized; courts disfavor antivesting ordinances);
Erickson, 123 Wash. 2d at 873, 872 P.2d at 1090 (city is free to develop vesting schemes best
suited to a particular locality within parameters of vesting doctrine established by statutory and
case law); Adams v. Thurston County, 70 Wash. App. 471, 479, 855 P.2d 284, 290 (1993) (ordi-
nance delaying vesting until completion of final EIS violated vesting rule).
Wholly separate from the issue of when an application is "complete," it is worth noting that
two separate laws require a local government to complete the processing of an application within
a certain time. For all types of land use permits (including plat applications), a local government
faces damages and attorneys fees liability under RCW § 64.40 for not processing a permit within
the time limits specified by local ordinance. The time limit provided by ordinance in most cities
and counties is 120 days. A recently expired statute required local governments to have 120-day
time-lines; most local governments have not amended their 120-day ordinances formerly re-
quired by the statute. See WASH. REV. CODE § 36.70B.080 (1998) (requiring municipalities to
establish time-limits for permit decisions); WASH. REV. CODE § 36.70B.090 (1998) (requiring
final decisions within 120 days). Significantly, a statute immunizing local governments from
RCW § 64.40 liability for failing to process applications within the times established by time-
limit ordinances expired concurrently with the 120-day statute. See WASH. REV. CODE §
64.40.50 (expired July 1, 2000). The expiration of the time-limit immunity statute makes it clear
that the legislature intended to provide a cause of action under RCW § 64.40 against a local gov-
ernment for failing to meet its own timeline ordinance.
204. Odgen v. City of Bellevue, 45 Wash. 2d 492, 496, 275 P.2d 899, 904 (1954).
205. Juanita Bay Valley Community Ass'n v. City of Kirkland, 9 Wash. App. 59, 84-85,
510 P.2d 1140, 1145 (1973).
206. Beach v. Snohomish County Bd. of Adjustment, 73 Wash. 2d 343, 438 P.2d 617
(1968).
207. Juanita Bay, 9 Wash. App. at 84-85, 510 P.2d at 1145.
208. Ford v. Bellingham-Whatcom County Dist. Bd. of Health, 16 Wash. App. 709, 714,
558 P.2d 821, 825 (1977). Instead of holding that septic permits do not vest, Ford suggested
that, had the applicant applied for a permit, the project would have vested.
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the previous law-that is, the preapplication standard-in effect on
the date she submitted a complete application °.2 9 This means that if
the preapplication standard does not allow the project, even a vested
project cannot be built.2 10  It also means that if no preapplication
standards were in effect, the project could not go forward211 because a
person cannot vest to a nonexistent standard. Thus, a preapplication
standard must have been validly enacted before a person can vest to
it. Additionally, only proposed uses disclosed in the application
211nyuevest.
2 1
Washington's pre-1987 common-law vested rights doctrine pro-
vides that a property owner can vest to the following categories of
standards: "zoning and procedures, ' 214 a "comprehensive plan, plan-
ning standards, [and] specifications,, 211 "applicable codes," 216 and a"use permit. "217 The following categories of standards have been held
in pre-1987 cases not to vest under Washington's common-law doc-
trine: a preliminary plat21t and "subdivisions ,21 (both later overruled
by statute), health safety and welfare standards,
20 and "fees. 221
209. Valley View Indus. Park v. City of Redmond, 107 Wash. 2d 621, 638, 733 P.2d 182,
192 (1987). See also Huebner, supra note 63, at 143-44.
210. Hass v. City of Kirkland, 78 Wash. 2d 929, 931, 481 P.2d 9, 10 (1971); Eastlake
Community Council v. Roanoke Assocs., Inc., 82 Wash. 2d 475, 486, 513 P.2d 36, 43 (1973)
("No consistent argument can be made for the vesting of rights on an invalid permit allegedly
cured by a subsequent event under a code which does not allow any such curing.").
211. Jones v. Town of Woodway, 70 Wash. 2d 977, 984, 425 P.2d 904, 909 (1967); Allen-
bach v. City of Tukwila, 101 Wash. 2d 193, 200, 676 P.2d 473, 476 (1984).
212. Kuphal v. City of Bremerton, 59 Wash. 2d 825, 828, 371 P.2d 37, 39 (1962) (new law
not properly passed because new zoning map not attached); State v. Thomasson, 61 Wash. 2d
425, 427, 378 P.2d 441, 443 (1963).
213. Mercer Enterprises, Inc. v. City of Bremerton, 93 Wash. 2d 624, 631, 611 P.2d 1237,
1241 (1980) (implying that only uses disclosed in application vest by noting local government is"entitled to rely on the representations made by [property owner] in the site plan."). This pre-
1987 common-law rule has been applied to the post-1987 vesting statute, but not very strictly.
See Noble Manor Co. v. Pierce County, 133 Wash. 2d 269, 285, 943 P.2d 1378, 1386-87 (1997);
see also Westside Business Park v. Pierce County, 100 Wash. App. 599, 5 P.3d 713 (2000), rev.
denied, 141 Wash. 2d 1023, 10 P.3d 1075 (2000) (storm water drainage standard discussed by
local government in pre-application talks vests even though standard is not actually part of the
plat application).
214. Norco Constr., Inc. v. King County, 29 Wash. App. 179, 191, 627 P.2d 988, 995
(1981), modified, 97 Wash. 2d 680, 649 P.2d 103 (1982).
215. Norco Constr., Inc., 29 Wash. App. at 192, 627 P.2d at 996.
216. Allenbach, 101 Wash. 2d at 200, 676 P.2d at 476.
217. Beach v. Board of Adjustment, 73 Wash. 2d 343, 347, 438 P.2d 617, 620 (1968).
218. Norco Constr., Inc. v. King County, 97 Wash. 2d 680, 687, 649 P.2d 103, 107-08
(1982).
219. Carlson v. Town of Beaux Arts Village, 41 Wash. App. 402, 406, 704 P.2d 663, 665
(1985).
220. Hass v. City of Kirkland, 78 Wash. 2d 929, 931, 481 P.2d 9, 10 (1971).
221. Lincoln Shiloh Assocs. v. Mukilteo Water Dist., 45 Wash. App. 123, 128, 724 P.2d
1083, 1086 (1986). This case held that only those things affecting the amount of land that can be
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The final element, filing during the effective period of the previ-
ous standard, is rarely at issue; it is relatively easy to determine what
the regulations were at the time the application was submitted. How-
ever, one difficult factual determination is sometimes involved in this
otherwise uncomplicated element. When a local government inten-
tionally delays a property owner's application and then enacts strin-
gent new regulations, a court is able to apply the previous standard.
Due process protections allow Washington courts to "look beyond
[the three elements] ... where city officials clearly frustrate a devel-
oper's diligent, good faith efforts to complete the permit application
process." '222 Therefore, when a local government delays a property
owner or otherwise interferes with the application process, an incom-
plete application can be considered "complete." '223 Similarly, the futil-
ity of applying can excuse the lack of an application."4 This power of
the courts to look beyond the three elements in certain situations
emphasizes the fairness at the heart of the Washington rule.
Because Washington consciously chose not to adopt the majority
rule, equity and reliance are not an element of the Washington rule.
Therefore, a property owner need not exhibit good faith22 or show
reliance226 on the preapplication standards.227
utilized vest; things affecting the cost of developing do not. Id. There was no precedent for a
"land" versus "cost" distinction in the vested rights doctrine. In fact, the entire purpose of vest-
ing protection is to protect property owners from changes affecting the cost of developing, thus
making the rationale for Lincoln Shiloh very questionable. Unfortunately, this erroneous ration-
ale has been applied to the vesting statute. New Castle Investments v. City of LaCenter, 98
Wash. App. 224, 233-34, 989 P.2d 569, 573-74 (1999) (impact fee ordinance does not vest
because such a fee "merely affects the ultimate cost of the development.").
222. Valley View Indus. Park v. City of Redmond, 107 Wash. 2d 621, 638, 733 P.2d 182,
192 (1987).
223. Parkridge v. City of Seattle, 89 Wash. 2d 454, 465, 573 P.2d 359, 366 (1978); Adams
v. Thurston County, 70 Wash. App. 471, 479, 855 P.2d 284, 289-90 (1993) (local government's"complete" application ordinance cannot thwart vesting by imposing nonplat related require-
ments); Friends of the Law v. King County, 123 Wash. 2d 518, 529, 869 P.2d 1056, 1062 (1994)
(city cannot frustrate the vesting process).
224. Norco Constr., Inc. v. King County, 29 Wash. App. 179, 191, 627 P.2d 988, 995
(1981), modified, 97 Wash. 2d 680, 649 P.2d 103 (1982); Parkridge, 89 Wash. 2d at 465, 573
P.2d at 366. See also Huebner, supra note 63, at 145, 150-58.
225. WASHINGTON REAL PROPERTY DESKBOOK Zoning § 97.8(2)(a) (good faith not a
requirement for vesting in Washington); Huebner, supra note 63, at 162 (conduct of the parties
should not be an element).
While "good faith" is not the test for determining a property owner's vested rights, two courts
have noted that a local government must process permits in "good faith." See Valley View Indus.
Park, 107 Wash. 2d at 642, 733 P.2d at 195; Erickson & Assocs. v. McLerran, 123 Wash. 2d
864, 871, 872 P.2d 1090, 1094 (1994). A third court has held that a property owner is entitled to
rely on a city's representations during the application process. See Mercer Enterprises, Inc. v.
City of Bremerton, 93 Wash. 2d 624, 631, 611 P.2d 1237, 1241 (1980).
226. Hull v. Hunt, 53 Wash. 2d 125, 129, 331 P.2d 856, 858 (1958); Eastlake Community
Council v. Roanoke Assocs., Inc., 82 Wash. 2d 475, 484, 513 P.2d 36, 43 (1973) (looking only to
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The reader must remember that the 1987 vesting statute,
described immediately below, only codified existing common law; it
did not supersede the common law. For example, at least one post-2281987 case recognizes vested rights outside the scope of the statute.
This is proof that the common-law vesting doctrine exists as a sepa-
rate, supplementary source of vesting protection.
3. The 1987 Vesting Statute: Even More Protections
While Washington's common-law vesting doctrine is fairly
coherent, the passage in 1987 of a vesting statute229 further clarified
the law. The statute provides:
A proposed division of land ... shall be considered under the
subdivision or short subdivision ordinance, and zoning or other
land use control ordinances, in effect on the land at the time a
fully completed application for preliminary plat ... has been
submitted to the appropriate county, city, or town official.230
"equity" would be an "arbitrary approach"); Ford v. Bellingham-Whatcom County Dist. Bd. of
Health, 16 Wash. App. 709, 715, 558 P.2d 821, 826 (1977). Allenbach v. City of Tukwilla, 101
Wash. 2d 193, 198, 676 P.2d 473, 475 (1984) (majority rule leads to "morass and uncertainties of
trial on 'good faith' and 'reliance."') (citation omitted); Valley View Indus. Park, 107 Wash. 2d at
655, 733 P.2d at 205 (no need for property owner to show "change of position"); Erickson &
Assocs., 123 Wash. 2d at 874, 872 P.2d at 106 (rejecting cost-based reliance analysis for vesting).
227. The reason that good faith is not an element of Washington's vested rights doctrine,
unlike the majority rule, is that it is presumed to exist. Good faith is presumed to exist on the
property owner's part because "[t]he cost of submitting an application and the time limitation on
commencing construction after a permit is issued are sufficient commitments to eliminate any
need for the courts to inquire into the good faith of the applicants." Allenbach v. City of Tuk-
willa, 101 Wash. 2d 193, 199, 676 P.2d 473, 476 (1984). Good faith is presumed to exist on the
government's part because "the citizen has a right to expect the same standard of honesty, justice
and fair dealing in his contact with the state or other political entity ... which he is legally
accorded in his dealing with other individuals." Finch v. Matthews, 74 Wash. 2d 161, 176, 443
P.2d 833, 842 (1968) (not a vesting case).
228. See, e.g., Weyerhaeuser v. Pierce County, 95 Wash. App. 883, 895, 976 P.2d 1279,
1286 (1999), rev. granted sub nom., Weyerhauser v. Land Recovery, Inc., 139 Wash. 2d 1001
(1999), appen. dismissed as moot (Feb. 10, 2000) (applying vested rights to conditional use permit,
which would not be covered by the plat-vesting statute, RCW § 58.17.033).
229. WASH. REV. CODE § 58.17.033(1) (1998). Actually, Washington passed two vesting
statutes in 1987, one for building permits (RCW § 19.27.095) and one for plats (RCW §
58.17.033). The pertinent language of the building permit statute is identical to the plat statute.
Compare WASH. REV. CODE § 19.27.095 (1998) with WASH. REV. CODE § 58.17.033 (1998).
See also Noble Manor Co. v. Pierce County, 81 Wash. App. 141, 144, 913 P.2d 417, 419 (1996),
aff'd, 133 Wash. 2d 269, 943 P.2d 1378 (1997) (RCW § 58.17.033 is similarly worded to RCW §
19.27.095). The building permit vesting statute will not be analyzed separately in this Article.
See supra note 16.
In addition to RCW § 58.17.033, Washington passed a vesting damages statute providing a
cause of action for the violation of vested rights and other related rights. See WASH. REV. CODE
§ 64.40.010(6) and .020 (1998), discussed infra notes 282-87.
230. WASH. REV. CODE § 58.17.033(1) (emphasis added).
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The vesting statute: "(1) codified the traditional common law
vested rights doctrine regarding vesting upon application of building
permits, and (2) enlarged the vesting doctrine to also apply to subdivi-
sion... applications. '231' Thus, the vesting statute enlarged the pro-
tections of the common-law doctrine.232
a. Statutory Vesting Doctrine, In General
On many points, the 1987 vesting statute did not alter the com-
mon-law doctrine. For example, under the vesting statute, an appli-
cation233 must still be "complete" to trigger the vesting doctrine. 234 In
addition, local governments still have the power to reasonably 23' define
a "complete" application by ordinance. 236 Another unchanged feature
231. Noble Manor Co. v. Pierce County, 133 Wash. 2d 269, 275, 943 P.2d 1378, 1382
(1997). See also Friends of the Law v. King County, 63 Wash. App. 650, 655, 821 P.2d 539, 541
(1991), rev. denied, 119 Wash. 2d 1006, 832 P.2d 488 (1992); Adams v. Thurston County, 70
Wash. App. 471, 475, 855 P.2d 284,287 (1993); Friends of the Law v. King County, 123 Wash.
2d 518, 520, 869 P.2d 1056, 1057 (1994); Erickson & Assocs., 123 Wash. 2d at 868, 872 P.2d at
1093; Noble Manor Co. v. Pierce County, 81 Wash. App. 141, 144, 913 P.2d 417, 419 (1996),
affd, 133 Wash. 2d 269, 943 P.2d 1378 (1997); Schneider Homes v. City of Kent, 87 Wash.
App. 774, 778, 942 P.2d 1096, 1098 (1997).
232. Friends of the Law, 123 Wash. 2d at 525 n.3, 869 P.2d at 1060, rev. denied, 119 Wash.
2d 1006, 832 P.2d 488 (1992); Noble Manor Co., 81 Wash. App. at 144, 913 P.2d at 419 (1987
statute changed two things: application must be complete, and land division-not just building
permits-is now protected), affd, 133 Wash. 2d 269, 943 P.2d 1378 (1997); Noble Manor Co.,
133 Wash. 2d at 275, 943 P.2d at 1378 (1987 statute extended vested rights doctrine to plats,
overruling Norco Constr., Inc. v. King County, 97 Wash. 2d 680, 649 P.2d 103 (1982)).
233. In addition to plat applications, the vesting statute arguably also covers binding site
plans. Binding site plans are essentially the equivalent of a plat and are covered in the Plat Act.
See WASH. REV. CODE § 58.17.035 (1998) (describing binding site plan). A binding site plan is
a proposed "division of land," id., and therefore should vest under the vesting statute. See
WASH. REV. CODE § 58.17.033(1) (1998) ("proposed division of land" vests).
234. WASH. REV. CODE § 58.17.033(1) (1998) (vesting triggered by "fully complete" ap-
plication). In contrast to the common-law doctrine that an incomplete application can be
excused if the local government frustrates the applicant's diligent efforts, one case claims that the
1987 statute takes "a 'zero tolerance' approach to completeness." Friends of the Law, 123 Wash.
2d at 525 n.3, 869 P.2d at 1060 (1994) (citation omitted). This is probably an overstatement for
two reasons. First, "vesting procedures which are 'vague and discretionary' cannot be used to
deny an applicant vested rights." Id.
Second, under the common-law doctrine, a local government's frustration of a property own-
er's attempt to submit an application violates due process. See supra note 222. The vesting
statute did not amend the due process clause, so the vesting statute-"zero tolerance" policy or
not-cannot be interpreted to allow a local government to frustrate vesting with unreasonable
"complete" application demands.
235. See supra note 234.
236. WASH. REV. CODE § 58.17.033(2) (1998) ("The requirements for a fully completed
application shall be defined by local ordinance."). See also Erickson & Assocs., 123 Wash. 2d at
873, 872 P.2d at 1095 ("municipalities are free to develop vesting schemes best suited to the
needs of a particular locality"); Noble Manor Co., 81 Wash. App. at 147, 913 P.2d at 420 (cita-
tion omitted). See generally Friends of the Law, 63 Wash. App. 654, 821 P.2d at 541 (providing
example of how local government defined "complete" application and how it affected vesting).
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of the statutory vesting doctrine is that only those proposed land uses
requested by the property owner in the application vest 237 although the
minimal information in a "bare bones" application has been held to
trigger vesting.238
The statutory vesting doctrine did, however, add several mean-
ingful features to the Washington rule. Most importantly, statutory
vested rights protect the right to "develop" property-not just divide
it into lots. 239 This is very significant, because the right to "develop"
property is essentially the right to finish a project as contemplated in a
land use application. The supreme court has acknowledged that
allowing anything short of the right to "develop" would merely be an"empty right.2 4° The court's holding that a vested right protects the
broad right to "develop" is consistent with commentators' observa-
tions that vesting protections should extend to "development rights
that are critical to the landowner's investment-backed expectations.
2 41
Another important addition of the statutory vesting doctrine is
that additional, related permits, such as a planned unit development,
242
vest along with the underlying application.243 Thus, applications "in-
While the ordinance defining "complete" controls, a local government's 20-year practice of
not requiring certain information in a plat application is given great deference. Friends of the
Law, 63 Wash. App. at 656, 821 P.2d at 542 (1991). If a local government has no "complete"
application ordinance, then courts look to the local government's plat processing ordinance.
Adams, 70 Wash. App. at 477, 855 P.2d at 289. A local government's decision that an applica-
tion is "complete" is reviewed de novo. Id.
Before RCW § 58.17.033(2) specified that local governments have the authority to determine
what constitutes a "complete" application, case law implied such a power. Mercer Enterprises,
Inc. v. City of Bremerton, 93 Wash. 2d 624, 628, 611 P.2d 1237, 1240 (1980).
237. Noble Manor Co., 133 Wash. 2d at 285, 943 P.2d at 1386-87. This requirement is not
strictly applied against property owners. See infra note 238.
238. Westside Business Park v. Pierce County, 100 Wash. App. 599, 5 P.3d 713, rev.
denied, 141 Wash. 2d 1023, 10 P.3d 1075 (2000) (property owner submitting a "bare bones"
application, without specifically addressing storm water drainage standard, enough to satisfy the
requirement to "reveal" intended use to local government).
239. Noble Manor Co., 133 Wash. 2d at 283, 943 P.2d at 1385; Schneider Homes, Inc., 87
Wash. App. at 778-79, 942 P.2d at 1099.
240. Noble Manor Co., 133 Wash. 2d at 280, 943 P.2d at 1384.
241. Hanes & Minchew, supra note 2, at 403 (footnote omitted). Even though we agree
with this commentator that "investment-backed expectations" form a general conceptual guide to
the kinds of rights protected by vesting, we decline to choose the very specific "investment-
backed expectations" test-and the horrible mess of takings cases that interpret this phrase-as
the test for the parameters of Washington's constitutional vesting doctrine. For an explanation,
see infra, note 306.
242. Schneider Homes, Inc. v. City of Kent, 87 Wash. App. 744, 778, 942 P.2d 1096, 1098
(1999) (planned unit development, an application which is "inextricably linked" to preliminary
plat application, vests with plat). See also Association of Rural Residents v. Kitsap County, 141
Wash. 2d 185, 194, 4 P.3d 115, 120 (2000) (applying Schneider Homes' "inextricably linked"
standard to a planned unit development proposal).
243. See Nadel, supra note 3, at 802; Hagman, supra note 2, at 542-43. See also DePalma,
supra note 26, at 507; Hagman, supra note 42, at 559-60 ("interrelated projects" should vest toge-
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extricably linked" to the plat application vest together.244 Similarly, a
proposal or application that "determines what the configuration of lots
will be" vests with the underlying plat application.245
b. Cases Defining "Land Use Control Ordinances"
The 1987 statute provides that a plat application vests to the"zoning and other land use control ordinances" in effect at the time of
application. Defining what constitutes "zoning" ordinances is easy:
they are contained in a local government's zoning code. 246  The hard
part is determining if a particular standard is a "land use control ordi-
nance.
Because the vesting statute is codified in the Plat Act,247 at first
blush it might seem that statutory vesting is narrowly limited to only
one kind of application, a plat application. However, that single appli-
cation encompasses many regulatory areas: open space, drainage,
streets, water supply, and many others.248 Therefore, statutory vesting
encompasses open space, drainage, street, water supply standards, and
other regulatory areas covered in a plat application. By specifying a
preliminary plat-an application encompassing so many regulatory
topics-as the trigger for statutory vesting, the legislature intentionally
extended vesting protection to all the many kinds of development
standards contained therein.
Reflecting the broad coverage of statutory vesting, a Washington
case has held that a "land development proposal"-an extremely
ther).
In a pre-1987 case, an additional permit (septic permit) did not vest with the underlying plat
application. See Ford v. Bellingham-Whatcom County District Bd. of Health, 16 Wash. App.
709, 714-15, 558 P.2d 821, 825-26 (1977). But in the Ford era, plat applications did not vest (see
Norco Constr., Inc. v. King County, 97 Wash. 2d 680, 649 P.2d 103 (1982)) so it is not surpris-
ing that additional, accompanying permits did not either.
Texas' vesting statute, TEX Loc. GOV'T CODE ANN. ch. 245 (West 1998 & Supp. 2000)
(previously H.B. 1704, 76th Leg. (Tex. 1999)) takes care of the accompanying permit issue. See
generally Hartman, supra note 9, at 315-16 (describing Texas' "series of permits" statutory
provision).
244. Schneider Homes, Inc., 87 Wash. App. at 778, 942 P.2d at 1098. See also DePalma,
supra note 26, at 507-08.
245. Association of Rural Residents, 141 Wash. 2d at 194, 4 P.3d at 120.
246. However, practitioners must be careful of ordinances adopted but not yet codified. A
good tip is to have the developer obtain a copy of the zoning ordinances in effect at the time of
application and save them for future reference. A suggestion would be to include compliance
statements on the preliminary plat or accompanying materials, i.e., storm drainage to comply
with a specific ordinance number, or road and sidewalk design to comply with a specific ordi-
nance number.
247. WASH. REV. CODE § 58.17 (1998).
248. WASH. REv. CODE § 58.17.110 (1998).
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broad category of applications-triggers vesting.249  Examples of a
"land development proposal" triggering statutory vesting include
planned unit developments, 250 storm-water drainage standards, 25 1 sep-
tic regulations, 212 and anything that "determines what the configura-
tion of the lots will be."" 3 Under what we call the "control rationale,"
if a standard controls the attributes of the project, that standard
statutorily vests, because it is a "land use control ordinance." As an
example of the control rationale, Washington cases hold that any
standard that exerts a "restraining or directing influence" over land
use254 or is a "mandatory prerequisite" to plat approval255 is a "land
use control ordinance" that statutorily vests.
In addition to the control rationale, case law has added another
large category of permits to the coverage of statutory vesting. As pre-
viously mentioned, all permit applications "inextricably linked" to the
plat application statutorily vest. 26  Between the dozens of standards
covered in the plat application and those "inextricably linked" to it,
statutory vesting covers almost every kind of land use standard in the
development process.
Further evidence of the broad coverage of statutory vesting
comes from cases holding that a property owner vests to the "rules
[and] policies, '2 7 "regulations,, 28 "land use laws, 259 and "laws ' 260 in
249. Erickson & Assocs. v. McLerran, 123 Wash. 2d 864, 867-68, 872 P.2d 1090, 1092-93
(1994). Another case interpreting "land use control ordinance" extremely broadly, to apply vest-
ing to numerous regulatory standards, is Association of Rural Residents v. Kitsap County, 141
Wash. 2d at 195, 4 P.3d at 120 (anything that "determines what the configuration of the lots will
be" vests).
250. Schneider Homes, 87 Wash. App. at 775-76, 942 P.2d at 1097 (defining "Planned Unit
Development"). Planned Unit Developments are a progressive planning tool, the use of which
the law should encourage. See DePalma, supra note 26, at 492 n.27, 494; Hanes & Minchew,
supra note 2, at 390-392.
251. Westside Business Park v. Pierce County, 100 Wash. App. 599, 5 P.3d 713 (2000),
rev. denied, 141 Wash. 2d 1023, 10 P.3d 1075 (2000).
252. Thurston County Rental Owners v. Thurston County, 85 Wash. App. 171, 182, 931
P.2d 208, 214 (1997).
253. Association of Rural Residents, 141 Wash. 2d at 194, 4 P.3d at 120. While not invok-
ing the "inextricably linked" language, another case holds that a standard that is not required to
be addressed in the plat application statutorily vests. See Westside Business Park v. Pierce
County, No. 24259-1-II, 2000 WL 238493 (Wash. Ct. App. Mar. 3, 2000).
254. New Castle Investments v. City of LaCenter, 98 Wash. App. 224, 232, 989 P.2d 569,
572 (1999).
255. Westside Business Park v. Pierce County, 100 Wash. App. 599, 5 P.3d 713 (2000),
rev. denied, 141 Wash. 2d 1023, 10 P.3d 1075 (2000).
256. Schneider Homes, 87 Wash. App. at 778, 942 P.2d at 1098. Also, applications that
"determine[] what the configuration of the lots will be" statutorily vest. Association of Rural
Residents, 141 Wash. 2d at 194, 4 P.3d at 120.
257. Adams v. Thurston County, 70 Wash. App. 471, 475, 855 P.2d 284, 287 (1993).
258. Erickson & Assocs., 123 Wash. 2d at 867-68, 872 P.2d at 1092-93 (1994); Adams, 70
Wash. App. at 475, 855 P.2d at 287.
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effect on the date of application. These very broad categories encom-
pass almost every land use standard imaginable. The only regulatory
scheme that has been held not to be a "land use control ordinance" isan impact fee ordinance. 26 1 The court held that impact fees did not
vest because they were analogous to taxes rather than a standard that
controlled the attributes of the project. While the court held that
impact fees do not statutorily vest, the question of whether impact fees
vest under the separate constitutional doctrine263 was not raised and
remains an open question.
C. Guidelines for Interpreting the Vesting Statute
For those kinds of permits that have not yet been litigated,
Washington law provides several guidelines for defining the term
"land use control ordinances." First, every statutory phrase should be
interpreted in light of the statute's purpose.264  The purpose of the
vested rights doctrine is to ensure certainty and fairness.265 Therefore,
every standard that gives a property owner certainty about the eco-
nomic viability of the project he or she is applying for should be con-
sidered a "land use control ordinance" that vests upon filing the
application. The legislature's declaration that it is "unfair to penalize
applicants that have submitted permit applications that meet current
requirements" 266 should provide guidance regarding which applica-
tions vest upon filing. Additionally, Washington's legislature and
courts have intentionally and consistently balanced the vested rights
doctrine in favor of the individual and against the government;
267
accordingly, interpretations of the vesting statute should tilt toward
the property owner.
Several interpretive guides provide valuable assistance when
analyzing the vesting statute. One is the rule of statutory construction
that a law should not be construed to have a retroactive effect.268
259. Noble Manor Co. v. Pierce County, 133 Wash. 2d 269, 278, 943 P.2d 1378, 1383
(1997). Adams, 70 Wash. App. at 475, 855 P.2d at 287.
260. Noble Manor Co., 133 Wash. 2d at 278, 943 P.2d at 1383.
261. New Castle Investments, Inc. v. City of LaCenter, 98 Wash. App. 224, 989 P.2d 569
(1999).
262. Id. at 229, 989 P.2d at 572.
263. See infra notes 288-308.
264. See Cherry v. Municipality of Metro. Seattle, 116 Wash. 2d 794, 799, 808 P.2d 746,
748 (1991).
265. See Hull v. Hunt, 53 Wash. 2d 125, 129, 331 P.2d 856, 858 (1958). See also supra
notes 150-59 (discussing certainty and fairness purposes of Washington's vested rights doctrine).
266. Ch. 347, 1999 Wash. Laws § 101.
267. See supra notes 166-67.
268. Hardy v. Superior Court of King County, 155 Wash. 244, 248-49, 284 P. 93, 95
(1930).
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Interpreting the vesting statute broadly in favor of vested rights pre-
vents retroactivity. Legislative history is another aid to interpreta-
tion."' The legislative history of the vesting statute shows that it was
meant to provide vesting to the broad category of "standards""27 in
place at the time of application." 1 The common-law doctrine, which
also provided broad protections, should assist in the interpretation of
the statutory doctrine in light of the similar rationales."
Of course, one of the best interpretive guides to the vesting stat-
ute is to remember that everything in a plat application, and those
things "inextricably linked" to it, vests. 3 Additionally, under the
control rationale, if a particular standard controls the attributes of a
project, it statutorily vests.274 These guidelines for future interpreta-
tions are well illustrated by applying them to currently undecided
vesting issues. For example, site plans27 should vest. A site plan is a
depiction of a proposed project, usually a commercial use, that in
many ways defines the intended use.276 All the standards that a prop-
erty owner must meet for a site plan (setbacks, density, etc.) "control"
the use of the property, making the site plan standards the quintes-
sential "land use control ordinance. "277
269. Young v. Estate of Snell, 134 Wash. 2d 267, 280, 948 P.2d 1291, 1297 (1998).
270. Final Legislative Report, 50-255, 1st Reg. Sess. (Wash. 1987).
271. Id.
272. Friends of the Law v. King County, 123 Wash. 2d 518, 522, 869 P.2d 1056, 1058-59
(1994).
273. See supra note 256.
274. See supra notes 254-55.
275. The term "site plan" used herein is not a "binding site plan" as described in RCW §
58.17.035. A "site plan" may or may not involve the division of land. See infra note 276 (citing
treatises describing a "site plan"). For reasons described infra, a site plan-whether it involves
the division of land or not-should vest, most notably because a site plan "controls" the project.
See supra notes 253-54 and accompanying text (describing the control rationale). On the other
hand, a "binding site plan" always involves a "division of land," thus triggering the vesting stat-
ute. See supra note 232 (describing site plans).
276. See G. PATRICK J. ROHAN, ZONING AND LAND USE CONTROLS, § 33C.01 (1996).
See, e.g., GIG HARBOR, WASH. MUNICIPAL CODE § 17.48 (site plans must include SEPA
checklist, vicinity map topographic map, landscape plan, general utility plan, building elevations,
and architectural style). Site plans are an innovative planning tool that is replacing plats and
building permits, in some ways, as the primary land use application. See 2 NORMAN WIL-
LIAMS, JR., AMERICAN PLANNING LAW § 48.01 (1987).
277. In addition to the control rationale, a site plan satisfies another vesting test because a
site plan "determines the configuration" of the lot or lots involved. Association of Rural Resi-
dents v. Kitsap County, 141 Wash. 2d 185, 195, 4 P.3d 115, 120 (2000) (a proposal that "deter-
mines the configuration" of the lots vests with the preliminary plat accompanying it). An
ultrastrict reading of Association of Rural Residents would require the site plan to accompany a
preliminary plat to qualify for "determines-the-configuration" vesting, but a site plan often
stands alone, without a plat application. Because a site plan also "determines the configuration"
of the project, it too should vest under Association of Rural Residents.
1088
2000] Vested Rights 1089
Another illustration is exempt wells. These small water wells278
are exempt from water permits that are nearly impossible to obtain. 279
Therefore, an exempt well is the only practical way to supply water to
a rural home, which is located away from municipal water pipes. Sev-
eral local governments are considering adopting ordinances to virtually
eliminate exempt wells.28 ° Plat applications require the property own-
er to disclose the method of water supply to proposed lots.281' An
application of the control rationale to a new, stringent antiexempt well
ordinance would yield a decision in favor of applying the previous
standard. Exempt wells certainly "control" the development; without
them, no water can be supplied to the project as a practical matter. In
addition to the control rationale, exempt wells standards should vest
because water supply is part of a plat application.
D. Statutory Damages for Violations of Vested Rights
Washington not only has a vested rights statute, it boasts a
unique vested rights damages statute.282 The vested rights damages
statute provides that a governmental entity is liable for damages2. 3 and
attorney's fees 284 if it "places requirements, limitations, or conditions
upon the use of real property in excess of those allowed by applicable
regulations in effect on the date an application is filed. '285 Statutory
278. WASH. REV. CODE§ 90.44.050 (1998); 1997 Op. Wash. Att'y Gen. No. 6.
279. Hillis v. Dep't of Ecology, 131 Wash. 2d 373, 932 P.2d 139 (1997).
280. The local governments are considering restrictive ordinances in response to 1997 Op.
Wash. Atty Gen. No. 6, which interprets the exempt well statute (RCW § 90.44.050) to permit
only one well per subdivision.
281. A plat application must describe how the lots will receive water. WASH. REV. CODE
§ 58.17.110(1)(a) (1998). See also WASH. REV. CODE § 19.27.097 (requiring building permit
applicant to "provide evidence of an adequate water supply for the intended use of the build-
ing."). Therefore, whether under the plat-vesting statute (RCW § 58.17.033(1)) or the building-
permit vesting statute (RCW § 19.27.095(1)), an applicant should vest to the exempt well ordi-
nance in effect at the time he or she applies. Friends of the Law v. King County, 123 Wash. 2d
518, 523, 869 P.2d 1056, 1060 (1994).
282. WASH. REV. CODE § 64.40 (1998).
283. The damages recoverable are:
[R]easonable expenses and losses, other than speculative losses or profits, incurred
between the time a cause of action arises and the time the holder of an interest in real
property is granted relief as proved by RCW 64.40.020. Damages must be caused by
an act [the denial of vested rights], necessarily incurred, and actually suffered,
realized, or expended, but are not based upon diminution in value of or damage to real
property, or litigation expenses.
WASH. REV. CODE § 64.40.010(4) (1998) (defining "damages").
284. WASH. REV. CODE § 64.40.010(2) (1998).
285. WASH. REV. CODE § 64.40.010(6) (1998). Note that the vesting damages statute,
RCW § 64.40, covers all permit applications, not just plat applications. the all-permits coverage
of RCW § 64.40 overlaps the plethora of varieties of permit applications are already covered
under the plat-vesting statue, RCW § 58.17.033. See supra notes 248-60 (discussing coverage of
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damages are available for the temporary denial of vested rights-the
period beginning with the denial of vested rights and ending with a
final judicial decision holding that a property owner's vested rights
have been violated.8 6 Therefore, because of the vesting damages stat-
ute, each violation of vested rights has two components (and two
causes of action): one for a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief
forcing the local government to apply the preapplication standard, and
a second for damages and attorney's fees to compensate the property
owner for the costs of going to court to force the local government to
honor the preapplication standard.8 7
E. Constitutional Vested Rights Doctrine
This Article also describes a previously overlooked constitutional
vested rights doctrine based on due process. Washington's constitu-
tional vested rights doctrine provides protections supplemental to our
288state's statutory and common-law protections. While no Washing-
ton case directly holds that there is a separate constitutional doctrine,
Washington courts, at least indirectly, have been deciding vesting
cases on constitutional grounds, both before and after the enactment
plat-vesting statutes). The vesting damages statute also applies to the state, not just local
governments. See WASH. REV. CODE § 64.40.010(1) (1998) (defining "agency" to include the
state).
The vesting statute, common-law, and constitutional vesting doctrines presumably also apply
to state agencies. However, the state never approves plats, so vesting issues rarely arise with state
agencies in the traditional land development context. See generally WASH. REV. CODE § 58.17
(1998) (plat decisions made by local governments). The state, of course, issues a variety of inci-
dental, but crucial, permits such hydraulics permits. See WASH. REV. CODE § 75.20.100 (1998)
(requiring state hydraulic permit for construction affecting waters and waterways). The com-
mon-law and, certainly, the constitutional vesting doctrines apply to the state and its agencies;
every rationale for protecting property owners from local governments applies equally to the
state.
The federal government issues a growing number of land use permits. It appears, perhaps in
dicta, that state-law vested rights can protect a property owner against a change in federal stand-
ards. See Westside Business Park v. Pierce County, 100 Wash. App. 599, 5 P.3d 713 (2000),
rev. denied, 141 Wash. 2d 1023, 10 P.3d 1075 (2000) (state-law vesting could protect landowner
from local government's change in ordinance to comply with its federal Clean Water Act permit
conditions because the Clean Water Act does not preempt local platting ordinance).
286. WASH. REV. CODE § 64.40.010(4) (1998). See also Hayes v. City of Seattle, 131
Wash. 2d 706, 934 P.2d 1179 (1997) (applying RCW § 64.40.010(4)).
287. Given that local governments must compensate property owners for violating vested
rights, one wonders why such violations are so common. One reason is that few property owners
have the resources to litigate, so local governments often get away with it. The second reason is
that sometimes-legal liability or not--elected local officials will bow to political pressures to
stop unpopular projects.
288. See Valley View Indus. Park v. City of Redmond, 107 Wash. 2d 621, 638, 733 P.2d
182, 192 (1987) (due process considerations of fundamental fairness allow the court to look
beyond statutory requirements).
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of the 1987 vesting statute.289 Whether it is labeled "constitutional" or
not, a constitutional vested rights doctrine exists.
It should not be surprising that vested rights are constitutionally
protected in Washington. Washington's constitution provides broad
due process protections, 29 ° and vested rights are the quintessential
expression of due process: the government cannot change the law
midstream and apply the new law retroactively. Remember that
under the vested rights doctrine, "the property owner is asking no
more than official permission to use his or her land in accordance with
the ... laws. 291' This is an apt description of due process. The "proc-
ess" of "law" that is "due" under the Washington or United States
Constitution is to have the legal standards in effect at a specific point
applied to a person-without the fear of retroactive changes causing
severe and unnecessary hardships to an innocent citizen.
Evidence of the constitutional doctrine comes from two primary
sources: (1) Washington courts' constitutional analysis of vesting
issues in case law, and (2) the existence of constitutional remedies for
violations of vested rights.
In the 1994 Erickson292 case, the Washington Supreme Court
held:
[O]ur vesting doctrine is rooted in constitutional principles of
fundamental fairness. The doctrine reflects a recognition that
development rights represent a valuable and protectable prop-
erty right. By promoting a date certain vesting point, our doc-
trine insures 'that new land-use ordinances do not unduly
oppress development rights, thereby denying a property owner's
right to due process under the law. Our vested rights cases thus
289. Prior to the vesting statute, vesting cases were decided on constitutional grounds. See
West Main Assocs. v. Bellevue, 106 Wash. 2d 47, 51, 720 P.2d 782, 785 (1986) (due process
requires the government to treat citizens in a fundamentally fair manner). Since the adoption of
the vesting statute, the courts have still decided cases based on constitutional grounds when the
statute was not triggered (no building permit or plat application involved). See Real Progress,
Inc. v. City of Seattle, 91 Wash. App. 833, 842, 963 P.2d 890, 895 (1998). "The vested rights
doctrine, on the other hand, implicates constitutional protections and prevents a retroactive
application even when the legislative intent is clear." Matson v. Clark County Board of Com-
missioners, 79 Wash. App. 641, 648, 904 P.2d 317, 321 (1995) (interim zoning ordinance
analyzed on constitutional, not statutory, grounds to determine vesting).
290. Both the federal and state constitutions contain due process protections. See U.S.
CONST. amend. V; WASH. CONST. art. 1, § 3. Washington courts have never specified which
constitution forms the basis for the constitutional vested rights doctrine.
291. Norco Constr., Inc. v. King County, 29 Wash. App. 179, 190, 627 P.2d 988, 994
(1981), modified, 97 Wash. 2d 680, 649 P.2d 103 (1982).
292. Erickson & Assocs. v. McLerran, 123 Wash. 2d 864, 872, 872 P.2d 1090, 1091
(1994).
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establish the constitutional minimum: a 'date certain' standard
that satisfies due process requirements.293
Numerous other cases confirmt Erickson's constitutional analysis
of vested rights,294 leaving no doubt that vested rights are constitu-
tional rights. Still more cases presume the constitutional nature of the
vesting doctrine by characterizing a local government's delay of the
application process to thwart vesting as a due process violation. 29 ' The
constitutional vesting doctrine has been applied before2  and after
297
1987, leading to the inescapable conclusion that the 1987 vesting stat-
ute merely supplemented the constitutional doctrine.
An even stronger reason to conclude that a constitutional doc-
trine exists is the fact that a constitutional remedy exists for the viola-
tion of vested rights. Following Erickson's holding that Washington's
vested rights doctrine "reflects a recognition that development rights
represent a valuable and protectable property right, ' 298 several other
cases held that a constitutional remedy exists for the denial of vested
rights. 299  The denial of a property owner's vested rights is an uncon-
293. Erickson & Assocs., 123 Wash. 2d at 870, 872 P.2d at 1094 (citations omitted).
294. Vashon Island Comm. For Self-Government v. Washington State Boundary Review
Bd. for King County, 127 Wash. 2d 759, 768, 903 P.2d 953, 957 (1995) ("The vested rights
doctrine is based on constitutional principles of fundamental fairness .... ); Noble Manor Co.
v. Pierce County, 81 Wash. App. 141, 145, 913 P.2d 417, 419 (1996), affd, 133 Wash. 2d 269,
943 P.2d 1378 (1997) ("The vesting doctrine is rooted in principles of fundamental fairness and
insures 'that new land-use ordinances do not unduly oppress development rights, thereby deny-
ing a property owner's right to due process under the law"') (citation omitted); Schneider Homes,
Inc. v. City of Kent, 87 Wash. App. 774, 778, 942 P.2d 1096, 1098 (1997) ("The vesting
doctrine is rooted in concepts of fundamental fairness and due process.") (footnote omitted);
West Main Assocs. v. City of Bellevue, 106 Wash. 2d 47, 50, 720 P.2d 782, 785 (1986)
("development rights are beyond question a valuable right in property .... One aspect of this
court's protection of these rights is the vested rights doctrine.") (citations omitted); Valley View
Industrial Park v. City of Redmond, 107 Wash. 2d 621, 656, 733 P.2d 182, 205 (1987) (vested
rights "are chiefly derived from.., due process concerns of fundamental fairness."). See also
supra notes 160-64 (analyzing the constitutional purpose of Washington's vested rights doctrine).
295. Norco Constr., Inc. v. King County, 97 Wash. 2d 680, 685, 649 P.2d 103, 106 (1982)
(local governments are "limited by due process protections.., in the decisions they make under
the adopted zoning plan."); id. at 686 (unreasonable delay in the application process "can prove
unconstitutionally detrimental to a developer harmed by this action."); Valley View Industrial
Park, 107 Wash. 2d at 639, 649 P.2d at 107 ("Due process considerations of fundamental fair-
ness require this court to [excuse the lack of an application] ... where city officials clearly
frustrate a developer's diligent, good faith efforts to complete the permit application process.").
See also supra note 199.
296. See Norco Constr., Inc., 97 Wash. 2d at 685-86, 649 P.2d at 106-07; West Main
Assocs., 106 Wash. 2d at 52, 720 P.2d at 785; Valley View Indus. Park, 107 Wash. 2d at 656, 733
P.2d at 205 (1987). Valley View Indus. Park was decided in 1987, but before the effective date of
the vesting statute. See also supra note 191.
297. Erickson & Assocs., 123 Wash. 2d at 870, 872 P.2d at 1094; Schneider Homes, 87
Wash. App. at 778, 942 P.2d at 1098.
298. Erickson & Assocs., 123 Wash. 2d at 870, 872 P.2d at 1094.
299. See Mission Springs, Inc. v. Spokane County, 134 Wash. 2d 947, 954 P.2d 250
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stitutionaP°° denial of due process,"' entitling him or her to obtain
monetary damages.3 °2 Of course, a constitutional remedy would not
be necessary to cure violations of mere common-law or statutory
rights, so one is forced to conclude a constitutional doctrine protects
vested rights-and Washington courts have done so.
The application of constitutional principles to the vesting doc-
trine makes sense: if a person has a due-process property right to
build under the laws she vested to, then protecting these vested rights
is a constitutional matter. Thus, the constitutional vested rights doc-
trine is merely the constitutional recognition of vested rights and the
subsequent protection of those rights under the due process clause.
Given that a constitutional vested rights doctrine exists, one
must identify its parameters. The constitutional doctrine provides a
"constitutional minimum""3 of vesting protections. Because the con-
stitutional vesting doctrine exists to protect due process-related prop-
erty rights to develop one's property,3 4 one commentator argues that
the doctrine should at least protect a property owner's investment-
backed expectations."' We disagree with an "investment-backed
expectations" analysis because it is unnecessarily complicated.3 6
(1998).
300. West Main Assocs., 106 Wash. 2d at 50, 720 P.2d at 1094. See also Delaney & Vaas,
supra note 89, at 31; Hartman, supra note 9, at 303; Ackerman, supra note 58, at 1222 (vested
rights determine amount of constitutional damages because they define the level of development
that would have been allowed); Nadel, supra note 3, at 798. See also supra note 163.
301. Delay can violate due process. See Norco Constr., Inc. v. King County, 97 Wash. 2d
680, 685, 649 P.2d 103, 106 (1982).
302. Mission Springs, 134 Wash. 2d 947, 971-72, 954 P.2d 250, 262. A damages action
survives the repeal of the postapplication standard the local government attempted to impose
against the property owner. West Main Assocs., 106 Wash. 2d at 785 n.1, 720 P.2d at 785
(1986). See also Hagman, supra note 42, at 562. The local government "should bear a heavy
burden" when it attempts to justify its denial of vested rights. Delaney & Vaias, supra note 89, at
34.
The nonconstitutional remedy of mandamus is also available. See Craven v. City of Tacoma,
63 Wash. 2d 23, 28, 385 P.2d 373, 375-76 (1963) (vested building permit "shall issue as a matter
of right"). These constitutional remedies are in addition to Washington's statutory damages
cause of action for the violation of vested rights. See WASH. REV. CODE § 64.40 (1998), dis-
cussed supra notes 268-307 and accompanying text. The vesting damages statute specifically
provides that its remedies "are in addition to any other remedies provided by law." WASH. REV.
CODE §64.40.040.
303. Erickson &Assocs., 123 Wash. 2d at 870, 872 P.2d at 1094.
304. Valley View, 107 Wash. 2d at 636, 733 P.2d at 191.
305. See generally Delaney & Vaias, supra note 89.
306. We believe it would be problematic to look at "investment-backed expectations" to
define the scope of the constitutional vested rights doctrine for two reasons. First, "investment-
backed expectations" is a test for determining whether a taking has occurred. "The criteria to
establish a taking are 'quite different' from that required to establish a deprivation of property for
want of due process..." Mission Springs, Inc., v. City of Spokane, 134 Wash. 2d 947, 964, 954
P.2d 250, 258 (1997) (citation omitted). Employing a taking standard to determine whether a
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Instead, we offer our own simple two-step definition of the para-
meters of the constitutional doctrine by utilizing the "trigger" and"vest-to-what" questions described earlier in the Article." 7 Accord-
ingly, we conclude that Washington's constitutional vested rights
doctrine provides that (1) the date a land use application is submitted
triggers vesting; and (2) due process requires that all the laws and
standards relating to the application in effect on that date must be
applied to that project, notwithstanding any postapplication changes.
The remedy for a violation of the constitutional doctrine, not
surprisingly, is the same remedy for the violation of other due process
rights: damages, attorneys fees, and injunctive relief.308 In effect, the
parameters of the constitutional vested rights doctrine covers, at a
minimum, the current (very broad) scope of Washington's common-
law and statutory vested rights. But the parameters of the constitu-
tional doctrine-reflecting the legislature's and courts' unmistakable
decision to favor property owners-must be broader that the com-
mon-law or statutory doctrines. The exact parameters will work
themselves out in future cases. The important point, however, is the
acknowledgment that a separate, more protective constitutional vested
rights doctrine exists.
F. Suggested Legislation to Improve Washington's
Vested Rights Doctrine
Returning to the statutory vested rights doctrine, very little leg-
islation is needed to improve Washington's vesting statute, because
almost every kind of permit necessary to property owners is already
protected.30 9 Furthermore, the common-law and constitutional vested
rights doctrines supplement vesting statutes, so little is left unpro-
tected. ' The Washington Legislature thought of everything-under
our state's unique vesting damages statute, property owners can be
due process violation of vested rights has occurred would unnecessarily complicate the issue.
Besides, takings law is a jurisprudential mess, and we would rather not import this clutter to the
vested rights doctrine. The second reason is that an "investment-backed expectations" analysis
sounds very similar to the majority rule's fuzzy equity analysis of a property owner's expendi-
tures in reliance on the current law.
307. See supra note 190.
308. Violations of due process are remedied by the federal civil rights statute. See 42
U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1988 (1994). See generally Mission Springs, 134 Wash. 2d 947, 954 P.2d 250
(1997) (applying federal civil statute to vesting-related due process issue). See also supra notes
163, 298-99 (describing constitutional remedies for violations of vested rights).
309. See supra notes 249-60.
310. See supra notes 231-32 (statutory doctrine supplements common-law doctrine) and
note 287 (constitutional doctrine supplements statutory and common-law doctrines).
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compensated for violations of their vested rights."' The only possible
substantive legislative improvement would be the codification of case
law holding that permits "inextricably linked 3 12 to a plat application
also vest.313 The Texas vesting statute provides this protection by
defining vesting protections to include a "series of permits."3 4 Al-
though legislation is probably not absolutely needed because case law
already protects accompanying permits, the certainty of statutory pro-
tection for a "series of permits" could only improve the development
process.
V. CONCLUSION
Washington should be proud. Our state's vested rights doctrine
is the most protective in the nation. The Washington rule does not
look to outdated building permits or fuzzy equity principles to estab-
lish vesting dates; we have a "date certain" vesting doctrine that
ensures vesting upon application, not approval. Washington's vesting
statute also covers almost every kind of standard confronting a prop-
erty owner, because these standards are contained in, or "inextricably
linked" to, a plat application and any standard that controls the devel-
opment. Washington's common-law, statutory, and constitutional
vesting doctrines are all separate and complimentary. A statutory
cause of action for damages supplements the constitutional remedies
available to property owners whose vested rights have been violated.
With regard to permit situations not yet litigated in Washington,
we provide a two-part analytical framework-"trigger" and "vest-to-
what"-to assist practitioners and courts in the interpretation of the
Washington vested rights doctrine in future situations.
We have identified a constitutional vested rights doctrine in
Washington and suggest a two-step analysis to define its general
parameters: a vested right is triggered on the date of application, and
due process protections require the laws and standards relating to the
project on the vesting date be applied to the application. In general,
we suggest that the guiding principles for future interpretation of the
doctrine should be certainty and fairness, with all doubts resolved in
favor of the property owner. Finally, we wholeheartedly urge other
states to adopt, by case law or statute, the Washington rule.
311. See supra notes 282-87 and accompanying text (discussing vesting damages statute).
312. See supra notes 250, 256, 273.
313. Id.
314. See supra note 145.
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